| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
091431
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Traditional analyses of Taiwan crises have relied mainly on deterrence theory for their explanatory power. This approach fails to account for China's risk-taking behavior, which can be explained by prospect theory. We suggest that Chinese leaders are more likely to use more risky military coercion against Taiwan's pro-independence movements within a domain of losses, i.e., when their regime faces serious domestic and international challenges to its security. Conversely, Chinese leaders are more likely to employ less risky political pressure to oppose Taiwan's pro-independence forces if their decision making takes place in a domain of gains, i.e., when the security of China's regime is not challenged. We conclude that maintaining a good US-China relationship is the best strategy for the United States to help prevent military crises in the Taiwan Strait.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
079762
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
140072
|
|
|
|
|
| Edition |
1st ed.
|
| Publication |
London, Macmillan London Ltd, 1971.
|
| Description |
320p.hbk
|
| Standard Number |
333130235
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 009908 | 951.055/TRE 009908 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|