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| 1 |
ID:
145626
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| Summary/Abstract |
Two decades later, how should we conceptualize the relevance of the Oslo Accords today? This article reconstitutes our understanding of the Accords through three parameters and purports that the legacy of the Interim Agreement is one that oscillates between what it has failed to achieve with regard to the Palestinian quest for statehood and what it continues to do as a mechanism influencing the “brand” Palestinian politics that can be practiced (uninhibitedly) within the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). In this way, charting the path for future research, this article concludes that any subsequent studies on Palestinian politics and political behavior would need to account for both what the Accords has not done and what it continues to do.
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| 2 |
ID:
101385
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although the important role of emotions in decision-making has been highlighted in the psychology, neural science, and decision research literatures, this conclusion has not been widely adopted in foreign policy analysis and International Relations (IR). Of the work that has been done, much of it has been focused on public perceptions and the impact on foreign policy, but not on elites and the actual decisions of foreign policy. This article seeks to address this imbalance by examining the role of one element of emotion - affect - on key foreign policy decision-makers. It argues that the greater the emotional attachment a leader has to an object, the less flexible she is in foreign policy toward that object. The model is used to explain a critical puzzle in IR: Israel's decision to pursue and sign the 1993 Oslo Accords.
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| 3 |
ID:
161218
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| Summary/Abstract |
Usually our opinions regarding any political event is connected to our previous knowledge and political involvement and is shaped by what we see, read, hear and watch on TV. However, as a 33-year-old housewife with only a high school education living in Amman, Jordan, at the time of the Oslo Accords in 1993, I understood that we had given up on our Historical Palestine by recognizing the state of Israel in exchange for a Palestinian mini-state in only the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital, while the important issues such as the right of return, borders and Jerusalem, among others, would be postponed to a later stage of negotiations.
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| 4 |
ID:
127336
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Almost thirty-five years after Camp David and twenty years after the Oslo Accord, a fundamental question remains unanswered: does the majority of the Israeli public support a left-wing or right-wing ideology? The answer, in a democratic system, should be obvious, since elections are supposed to give a clear picture of the political preferences of the voting public. However, Israeli polls are misleading. After the Yom Kippur disaster in 1977, Menachem Begin won his premiership running as the hawkish leader who never would surrender even one grain of sand from the Land of Israel. Yet after he personally gave up the entire Sinai Peninsula his party won an even greater majority in 1981.1 Yitzhak Rabin won his premiership in 1992 representing the hawkish section of the Labor party with declarations that he would never negotiate with the PLO;2 yet it seems that signing the Oslo Accords led him, rather, to the peak of his popularit.
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| 5 |
ID:
110845
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Rationalist explanations of foreign policy change are underdetermined because they overlook the decision-makers themselves. Insight from cognitive psychology shows that individuals' cognitive structures provide a useful lens through which to understand why some people are more likely than others to change their core beliefs. Two related cognitive variables - cognitive openness and cognitive complexity - hold promise for enhancing extant explanations of foreign policy change. This article assesses the cognitive structure of the three leaders who dominated Israeli decision-making in the decade leading up to Israel's dramatic policy change vis-à-vis the PLO in 1993: Yitzhak Shamir, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. The article demonstrates that Peres, who is found to be the most cognitively open and complex, was quicker to embrace a dialogue with the PLO than Rabin, while Shamir, who is found to hold the lowest levels of openness and complexity, rejected this move altogether. Peres, and to a lesser extent Rabin, proved to be more sensitive to international, regional and domestic changes than Shamir. This case illustrates that systemic-structural and domestic political factors are necessary, but insufficient, conditions for foreign policy change. The levels of decision-makers' cognitive openness and complexity are key to determining the likelihood that they will change their beliefs on a core policy issue that can, in turn, lead to foreign policy change. This article thus contributes to our understanding of both foreign policy change and the process leading up to the historic 1993 agreement between Israel and the PLO.
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| 6 |
ID:
145618
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study seeks to explain the implications of the US's withdrawal from the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, resulting in the weakening of the Palestinian Authority, and calls for abrogating the Oslo Accords. Causes of the failure of the Accords, such as the Palestinians' inability to act on Oslo's projected date of 1990 for statehood, or to stand up to the Clinton Parameters for peace, or to stem the tide of the Jewish settlement movement, or to capitalize on pronouncements of the International Criminal Court on the Wall and the settlements, are examined. International stalemate resulting from Israel's freezing of the Quartet's Roadmap leading to Israel's rebranding itself as a Jewish state hammered the last nail in the coffin of the two-state solution. The article concludes with an assessment of Israeli reaction to the one-state solution.
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| 7 |
ID:
079933
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyses the role of cultural shift, as defined by Inglehart, in the major change in Israeli foreign policy embodied in the Oslo Accords. Aside from providing an empirical explanation, it also analyses the Oslo case from a general theoretical perspective concerning the relationship between cultural change and foreign policy change. It argues that a cultural shift towards Postmaterialism led to the rise of a new generation on the Israeli Left with a more Liberal outlook. It was this `Liberal Left' that was primarily responsible for conceiving, initiating and enacting the Oslo Accords. In broader terms, this study provides a new way of examining the relationship between cultural change and foreign policy change. As such, it provides a solid basis for the comparative analysis of the role of a substantive, worldwide cultural trend on foreign policy.
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| 8 |
ID:
129796
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The signing of the Oslo Accords created a tremendous sense of optimism. The Declaration of Principles signed between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Israeli government in 1993 led to many countries establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, a rise in Israel's GNP, and two productive economic conferences in Morocco and Jordan. One of the memories that best symbolizes this period for me occurred in May 1994: I had been invited to Washington by the president of the United States, and on the plane ride there, the whole cabin approached me with their menus asking me to autograph them. People were really excited, telling me: "This is peace! It's good for both parties." I felt their euphoria. It was a win-win game.
You cannot sign a peace treaty in a win-lose game, while devastating the other party. One only needs to look at what happened to the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq as examples. You don't really achieve a long-term solution with devastating wars. The only way you can build real peace is if it's a win-win situation: through negotiations, conversations and dialogues that lead to agreements which equally - or at least satisfactorily - satisfy both people. When it comes to our situation, I think it's not normal to talk now about permanence in these negotiations. Why? Because the interim agreement has continued for over 20 years. It is now 20 years since we signed the Declaration of Principles and the Oslo Agreement in the White House. So we have lived for 20 years in "interimness," and we have become accustomed to it. But "interimness" is not good for the Palestinians: While we've been in this seemingly never-ending interim time period, the Israeli government has been unilaterally changing the parameters, the terms of reference and the reality on the ground, thereby undermining the basis for a permanent solution.
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| 9 |
ID:
138767
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines foreign policy change, identifying structural parameters of domestic and international origins that bring about major foreign policy shifts. Domestic structural parameters comprise the politico-institutional setting and advocacy groups in support of alternative foreign policy options. International structural parameters refer on the one hand to systemic changes that may bring about foreign policy realignment and, on the other hand, to the country’s role in the international system and its interactions with other countries that may activate foreign policy changes. We posit that this eclectic approach is necessary to account for major, multidimensional and complex, foreign policy decisions. We use this analytical framework to examine the Israeli re-orientation that enabled the signing of the Oslo Peace Agreement in the early 1990s.
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| 10 |
ID:
180888
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| Summary/Abstract |
From the perspective of a practitioner who was deeply engaged in the negotiations, this article describes how the Israeli-Palestinian Mutual Recognition Agreement was conceived and negotiated. It explains the process of convincing Israeli and Palestinian leaders to accept mutual recognition, overcoming their initial objections. While not nearly as publicized as the 1993 Declaration of Principles agreed at Oslo, this Agreement became the bedrock for all the Oslo Accords, and set the stage for subsequent negotiations.
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| 11 |
ID:
167161
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article records my interview with Professor Ambassador Itamar Rabinovich. We discussed the keys for successful peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians; the differences between Camp David 1978 and Camp David 2000; The Oslo Accords; the role of the United States as a mediator and the potential of other countries to become mediators; the viability of a two-state solution; peace with Syria; Taba; Annapolis; the Israeli evacuation of Gaza, and the rise of Hamas. The interview assesses the positive and negative lessons and implications of the peace process, and the likelihood of bringing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a close.
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| 12 |
ID:
182897
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| Summary/Abstract |
Israeli PM Ehud Olmert (2006–9) offered the Palestinians the most comprehensive peace deal they had ever received. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas said he would reply ‘soon’ and never did. This interview records Olmert’s thoughts on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and his own attempts to end the bitter conflict.
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| 13 |
ID:
171695
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the growing number of studies analysing the role of media in peace processes, there is almost no literature on the relationship between media and public opinion during peace processes. This article examines this question using the case study of the Oslo Accords. Specifically, it analyzes the compatibility between media portrayals of Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin and Israeli and Palestinian public support for peace negotiations. The findings indicate that (a) the enemy’s binary image may change positively following the signing of peace agreements; and (b) this change may accelerate emerging peace processes.
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| 14 |
ID:
161382
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article records an interview with Joel Singer, one of the authors of the Oslo Accords who was brought into the process from Washington DC at a later stage of the negotiations. The Oslo channel was established by Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin, Norwegian academic Terje Rød-Larsen and Israeli academic Yoel Hirschfeld, who understood Yasser Arafat’s need to initiate a new path for relationships with Israel. At that time, negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were illegal. The PLO was considered a terrorist organisation and the Israeli government refused to officially negotiate with Arafat, though it was clear that he was still the person most able to strike a deal, and the only true representative of the Palestinian people. Bilateral negotiations begun in Washington between Israelis and Palestinians who were supposedly independent of the PLO led to nowhere. This is Singer’s version of this peace chapter. The article assesses the positive and negative aspects, lessons and implications of the process and of the Oslo Accords.
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| 15 |
ID:
169256
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| Summary/Abstract |
Reconciliation-based initiatives evoke a substantive and meaningful vision of peace and suggest a form of peace building that is intimately engaged at the personal and social level. This article critically engages with a specific reconciliation initiative, the People-to-People Program (P2PP) that was applied to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It uses Gramscian concepts of hegemony, consent, and war of position, with the intention of illustrating that the program functioned as a disciplinary or regulatory device that structured and realigned the agency of its Palestinian participants. In highlighting the different features and dimensions of Palestinian subversion and resistance, it brings out the limits of hegemony.
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| 16 |
ID:
180229
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes the political narratives and critiques of young Palestinian refugees who have grown up in the bleak post-Oslo period. Based on ethnographic fieldwork and interviews conducted with refugee youth in Jordan and the West Bank between 2009 and 2014, I show that this generation of refugees endorses a collective Palestinian identity and peoplehood with claims to the (home)land while also narrating their identities and relations to land, nation, state, and rights as complex, multifaceted, and fractured. Their political imaginaries do not limit the political and epistemic project of decolonizing Palestine to the classic paradigm of a territorialized nation-state as enshrined in the Oslo two-state agenda. Rather, they point to a creative and radical, post-nation-statist, translocal politics for Palestine.
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| 17 |
ID:
173126
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article responds to the relative neglect of reading Mahmoud Darwish from a postmodern perspective. Inspired by postmodern theory, we suggest that Darwish after Oslo agreements in 1993 seeks to have a displaced and dialectical encounter with the collective identity; he utilizes a transition from being into becoming, from filiation into affiliation, knowing that this transition mirrors rifts, ruptures, and fractures in the Palestinian historical and geopolitical conditions in the post-Oslo era. By looking at poems written after the Oslo Accords, which were described by Bashir Abu-Manneh as “the root cause of the disintegration and liquidation of Palestinian agency,” we argue that Darwish's persona manifests the postmodern intellectual who is tempted to leave the collective and expatriate himself to hone an independent self and thought that provides a fresh perspective and a new understanding of Palestinian collectivity. While Darwish's pre-Oslo poetry expressed a collective voice, identification, and commitment to the national narrative, after Oslo, he gets more personal and, perhaps, detached from and critical of the nationalist political entities and narratives. Building on theoretical insights from both postcolonial and postmodern intellectuals, we also articulate ways in which the dialectical relation between postcolonialism and postmodernism appears in Darwish's poetry. We find that the persona at times combines, and at other times, fluctuates between, singularity and multiplicity, certainty and suspicion, the collective and the personal, place and space, tradition and innovation, while seeking revision, transition, contingency, dynamism, fluidity in the contemporary, post-Oslo time.
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| 18 |
ID:
124364
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It is claimed that settlements are a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians (1949). But both the text of that convention, and the post - World War II circumstances under which it was drafted, clearly indicate that it was never intended to refer to situations like Israel's settlements. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, Article 49 relates to situations where populations are coerced into being transferred. There is nothing to link such circumstances to Israel's settlement policy. A special regime between Israel and the Palestinians is set out in a series of agreements negotiated between 1993 and 1999 that are still valid-that govern all issues between them, settlements included. In this framework there is no specific provision restricting planning, zoning, and continued construction by either party. The Palestinians cannot now invoke the Geneva Convention regime in order to bypass previous internationally acknowledged agreements.
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| 19 |
ID:
178791
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the transnational histories that have conditioned Palestinian youth organizing in the United States from the 1950s to the present day. It examines the organizational vehicles of earlier generations of activists such as the Organization of Arab Students (OAS) and the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) to trace the formation of the U.S. chapter of the transnational Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM). It argues that in the Oslo and post-Oslo eras, which severed the Palestinian diaspora from the national body politic and the rich Palestinian organizational histories of the pre-1993 period, the lessons of their forerunners are instructive for PYM’s new generation of organizers. The article posits that transnational connections have profound implications for localized U.S. political organizing and that contemporary Palestinian youth organizing is part of a historical continuum. Drawing on oral history and scholar-activist ethnographic methods, the article situates contemporary youth organizing in its transnational and historical contexts.
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| 20 |
ID:
180889
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This article tells the story of how and why, when negotiating the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords in 1993–95, the author developed the concept of dividing the West Bank into three areas with differing formulas for allocating responsibilities between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in each. The origin of how these areas were named is also discussed. This negotiation demonstrates that parties are prepared to modify ideological positions when detailed and practical options are presented that constitute a hybrid to the parties’ former positions.
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