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| 1 |
ID:
162233
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article empirically investigates the effects of corruption and privatisation on economic growth in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR. We use a corruption and privatisation augmented open-economy leader–follower endogenous growth model to derive our research hypotheses. In this setting, corruption, privatisation and external openness jointly determine the per capita income in the follower economy. This model predicts that economies with higher shares of private ownership, lower corruption, and higher external openness enjoy higher rates of growth. Our empirical verification of these predictions is based on a panel of 29 post-communist countries during the period 1996–2014. Our estimation results confirm the negative effects of corruption, while the positive effects of privatisation are limited to small-scale privatisation.
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| 2 |
ID:
128248
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Interpersonal trust in post-communist societies is particularly low, and is often cited as an impediment to democratic consolidation. One way in which countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have tried to build trust is through transitional justice measures, particularly lustration or vetting policies. There is a direct relationship postulated between lustration, transitional justice, and social trust building. This paper tests this assumption by examining the impact of both targeted lustration and broader transitional justice programmes on social trust. The study finds there is a divergent impact of lustration on trust, both building particularised trust in social institutions and undermining generalised interpersonal trust.
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| 3 |
ID:
079951
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
There is growing evidence that states' formal ratification of international human rights treaties does not generate changes in states' domestic human rights practice. This article proposes to investigate a gap between states' formal commitments to international laws and their domestic practice by careful differentiation of mechanisms of social influence: coercion, persuasion, and acculturation. It is argued that each mechanism has profound implications for rates of ratification of international treaties and the scope of implementation. Two arguments drive the discussion. First, states often ratify international treaties in response to perceived or real social pressures to formally assimilate with other states in the global arena. Thus, they do not have intentions or capacities to implement them. Second, ratification of human rights agreements makes states vulnerable to social pressures of monitoring bodies, which generates different levels of policy compliance. I explore the empirical merits of this approach on the analysis of government compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women provisions on violence against women in 26 post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
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