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| 1 |
ID:
191622
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the last 15 years, many have been the changes in relation to the transformation of the Salafiyya trend since Wiktorowicz’s 2006 seminal work. The categories of ‘ilmi (scientific), siyyasi (political), and jihadi (violent) Wiktorowicz put forth in 2006 are here questioned. Building on studies looking at the internal mutations of the Tunisian Salafi movement after 2014, the article explores how, with the exception of tawhid, the scientific trend is divided between malikists and madkhalists. In addition, through the close observation of pious women within the koranic association Imam Malik in Tunis, the argument is that, within scientific Salafism, there are in fact multiple internal ideological conflicts, which are hardly reconcilable in on single category. Through the empirical case of conservative religious women in Tunisia and providing therefore a gender dimension to this discussion, the article concludes that reducing quietism to a single coherent internal ideological framework and a set of lived practices is misplaced.
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| 2 |
ID:
120283
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| 3 |
ID:
129510
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| 4 |
ID:
111718
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It changes character, like in quantum mechanics, even as we watch. The French revolution did that in the late 1780s and early 1790s. But spring is gone, and revolt is in, so far not revolution. There are layers of rulers and layers of opposition. The unveiling has started.
If winter seeds from a suicide in Tunisia made buds sprout in early spring, then they must have fallen on fertile soil. Events make processes when "stability" is unstable, like the huge power and wealth gaps. The U.S. trick is to make people believe in individual mobility: "If you don't make it, it is your fault." Others see it as a relation: By taking power-wealth from us they got powerful-rich and we powerless and poor. The former is individualist and person-oriented; the latter collectivist and system-oriented. See it that way and revolts follow, like Tahrir Square, like Wall Street. But some resources are needed.
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| 5 |
ID:
116436
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Prominent scholars have highlighted important similarities between the Arab Spring of 2011 and the "revolutions" of 1848: Both waves of contention swept with dramatic speed across whole regions, but ended up yielding rather limited advances toward political liberalism and democracy. I seek to uncover the causal mechanisms that help account for these striking parallels. Drawing on my recent analysis of 1848, I argue that contention spread so quickly because many people in a wide range of countries drew rash inferences from the downfall of Tunisia's dictator. Applying cognitive heuristics that psychologists have documented, they overrated the significance of the Tunisian success, overestimated the similarities with the political situation in their own country, and jumped to the conclusion that they could successfully challenge their own autocrats. This precipitation prompted protests in many settings that actually were much less propitious; therefore problems abounded. Cognitive shortcuts held such sway because Arab societies were weakly organized and repressed and thus lacked leaders from whom common people could take authoritative cues. The decision whether to engage in emulative contention fell to ordinary citizens, who-due to limited information access and scarce experience-were especially susceptible to the simple inferences suggested by cognitive heuristics.
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| 6 |
ID:
117822
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The popular uprising that started in Tunisia in December 2010 quickly spread across the Arab world, culminating in a historic regional realignment with far-reaching implications. This essay details the implications of the Arab Spring for Israeli security. After highlighting the history of Israel's defense strategy and reviewing the Arab Spring revolts, the authors find that the recent uprisings exacerbate several issues faced by Israel, including geopolitical relations with other countries in the region, energy issues, and growing threats presented by nonstate actors.
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| 7 |
ID:
114333
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| 8 |
ID:
125075
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A high degree of pessimism continues to hold a strong grip over the enthusiasts of democracy in the Arab world. In the last more than two years, the popular uprisings for social and political change have stalled in Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen. In Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, where the populace succeeded in toppling the authoritarian rulers, the situation did not change that much. Violence, conflicts, and killings of political opponents disturbingly characterize all the Arab countries affected by the popular uprisings. In Syria, the government and opposition forces are locked in a deadly conflict with neither side being able to make a decisive breakthrough. The Egyptian army overthrew the country's first democratically elected government, headed by the Muslim Brotherhood, on 3 July 2013. On the whole, the success rate of democratization is so far disappointing. That begs the question whether the Arab popular uprisings for democratic change, what the media has conveniently dubbed the 'Arab Spring', are failing or still enduring.
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| 9 |
ID:
129869
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| 10 |
ID:
112179
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Revolutions are by nature unpredictable and unsettling. That the wave of revolutions in North Africa and the Arab Middle East began so unexpectedly and spread with such speed, leading to the fall of the governments of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, has added to the concern regarding the "new order" that is to come after the initial euphoria. From the outset, the fear has been that these revolutions will follow the same trajectory as Iran did in 1979-in other words, that they will marginalize those who launched the revolutions and provide the grounds for the rise to power of the most savvy, purposeful, and best organized of the opposition groups, namely, the Islamists. Yet when one considers the recent uprisings in the Arab world through the prism of Iran's experiences in 1979, the parallels are not so evident. Mindful of the variations and distinctions between each of the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, it would appear that in broad terms, and beyond superficial similarities, there is little in common between the events of Iran in 1979 and what has happened in the past year in the Arab world.
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| 11 |
ID:
112956
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Arab Spring has entered its second year, and the course of events has vividly proved the predictions of analysts. The process, which started quite accidentally in Tunisia in December 2010, has triggered fundamental changes. These changes will transform the political landscape of the Middle East and make people take a new look at the world. The era, which opened with the fall of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union 20 years ago, is over, and a new era is unfolding before our eyes. The essence of the new era is yet unclear. There are more unknown than known variables in this equation for Russia and the rest of the world.
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| 12 |
ID:
115057
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| 13 |
ID:
185467
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| Publication |
DelhI, Macmillan Education India Pvt. Ltd., 2022.
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| Description |
xii, 308p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9789354552755
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 060190 | 320.56/FAB 060190 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 14 |
ID:
125384
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since its outbreak in the beginning of 2011, the Arab transformation that swept almost the whole middle east has now entered the third year with its geopolitical implications beginning to unfold gradually. When erupted in Tunisia and Egypt, it was driven primarily by internal dynamics and was regarded as a genuine local, bottom up movement in general. Much to people's surprise, incumbent regimes such as the Mubarak regimes in Egypt and Ben Ali regime in Tunisia that were once considered to be durable and formidable were too quick to be overthrown.
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| 15 |
ID:
111597
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| 16 |
ID:
107213
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| 17 |
ID:
105002
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, men demonstrated wearing frying-pan basinets. Tin-pot cervellieres. Water-bucket shakos. The green, plastic chain mail of a wastebasket. A young man trussed a rumpled trio of empty water bottles to his head with a swatch of torn bed linen. A protester in Sanaa taped two baguettes and an unleavened pancake of chapati to his skull.
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| 18 |
ID:
115071
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
After the popular uprisings that struck in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria, the surviving Middle East monarchies have come under heavy criticism in the West. Many believe it is only a matter of time until they are next. The conventional wisdom in the West is that this revolutionary change in the Middle East must be a positive thing. Popular demands for political freedom are viewed as part of the inevitable march of progress. Another implicit assumption in the West is that the monarchies, like the corrupt autocrats who have fallen, lack popular support.
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| 19 |
ID:
110154
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| 20 |
ID:
160357
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Migration from South and East Mediterranean (SEM) countries has been considered a growing security threat in the EU and Gulf states following the 9/11 attacks and the Arab uprisings. Since 2011, the economic slowdown, regime changes and socio-political instability have spurred growing migration pressure from SEM countries. However, the securitisation of migration of young citizens from these countries in the EU and the Gulf states is manifested in the drastic limitation of migrants’ inflows, and in the selection of prospective migrants on demographic, socio-economic and political grounds. Today’s ‘governmentality’ of youth migration from SEM countries poses ethical and development-related issues.
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