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ID:
184555
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article describes the crisis of modern international relations theory
(IRT) and assesses the prospects of political realism for developing a
nationally oriented theory in Russia. The authors believe that realism can
significantly contribute to the development of such a theory. However, the
developmental tasks facing Russia go beyond the scope of realism; Russia
must formulate a comprehensive idea of ​​national development and IRT.
The national idea should not be confined to the country’s survival and
security; it should include the national understanding of freedom, values ​​
and development resources. Realism is not the whole truth, and in some of
its manifestations it substitutes truth by power.
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| 2 |
ID:
080149
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the past decade, the application of the Poliheuristic (PH) theory to foreign policy decisions of various types, by numerous leaders, and in association with different research methods, has demonstrated its theoretical merit in integrating the divided rational choice and psychological/cognitive approaches. This article argues for a complementary relationship between PH and formal theory. On the one hand, PH can provide a framework in which abstract formal models can be connected with specific domestic as well as international circumstances. On the other hand, formal theory sharpens the rational analysis used in the second conceptual stage of PH. In this study, I formulate a revised Rubinstein bargaining model with war as an outside option and apply it to Chinese crisis decision making during the Second and Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. In sum, this study makes three contributions to the literature on international crises and foreign policy analysis. First, it gives formal explanations on how PH can contribute to the game-theoretic approach in foreign policy analysis. Second, it presents what Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) called a "domestic politics version" of the canonical Rubinstein bargaining game, connecting international interactions with individual participants' domestic politics. Finally, it provides a way to test abstract game-theoretic models in particular domestic and international contexts of foreign policy making.
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| 3 |
ID:
090146
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Kenneth Waltz opted to reject the rational actor assumption in developing his theory of international politics. That choice, I argue in this article, creates three problems for his theory. First, it means that it is unsuited for explaining state behavior, which means it is of limited utility for explaining the workings of the international system. Second, Waltz's claim that his theory is well suited to explaining international outcomes - as opposed to state behavior - is unconvincing. Those outcomes are heavily influenced by the actions of the great powers, but if his theory cannot predict their behavior, it is unlikely to reliably predict the outcomes of their behavior. Third, Waltz's assumption that states often behave recklessly leads to a more competitive world than described in his theory. I conclude with the suggestion that the theory's greatest virtue is its normative value - its ability to explain how the world should work, not how it works.
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| 4 |
ID:
162813
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