| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
099186
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| 2 |
ID:
082032
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article revisits the electoral emphasis of hybrid regime studies, arguing instead that the impact of elections is structured by variations in prior political institutions, particularly the dismantlement or maintenance of a ruling party. Duration tests on 136 regimes indicate that ruling parties reduce the chance of regime collapse, while "electoral autocracy" has no significant effect. A paired comparison of Malaysia and the Philippines then shows how variations in party institutions propelled divergent courses of authoritarian dominance and democratization. During the late 1980s and 1990s, Malaysia's ruling party (UMNO) bound together otherwise fractious leaders, twice deflecting potent electoral challenges. By contrast, when Ferdinand Marcos abandoned the Nacionalista Party after 1972, he fueled the movement that would subsequently oust him. The efficacy of opposition parties Semangat '46 and United Nationalist Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) was thus heavily imbricated with the institutions of the regimes they challenged and less contingent on short-term electoral politics.
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| 3 |
ID:
173771
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scholars of public opinion on military intervention agree that survey respondents make judgments from limited information. Yet researchers still question whether ordinary Americans reflect elite attitudes or instead reach their own “pretty prudent” conclusions from the stated principal policy objective (PPO). This article adjudicates the debate while incorporating lessons from the study of bounded rationality. Evidence comes from an original data set of aggregate US public opinion, covering 1,080 nationally representative survey items about launching operations, across thirty-five countries, during 1981 to 2016. Tests show that PPO matters: pursuing “internal policy change” is less popular than restraining international aggression. However, language reflecting White House cues and one prominent cognitive shortcut (the “availability heuristic”) statistically and substantively outperforms PPO at predicting intervention support. The results indicate that when ordinary Americans are polled about using force against salient foes (Saddam Hussein, al-Qaeda, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), elements of bounded rationality can overtake the prudence expressed toward less vivid problems.
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| 4 |
ID:
080170
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| 5 |
ID:
111020
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Jason Brownlee assesses the foundations of the contemporary U.S.-Egyptian alliance, which was consolidated in 1979 by the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. He concludes that the bold diplomacy of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was matched by fierce repression at home. Moreover, Egypt's foreign interlocutors presupposed that authoritarianism inside Egypt would help guarantee the country's new foreign policy alignment.
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| 6 |
ID:
157526
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| Summary/Abstract |
Institutionalist accounts of sectarian and ethnic conflict tend to emphasize national divisions. For the "master cleavages" of identity politics to shape behavior, however, they must be reproduced at the local level. Otherwise, citizens will not experience private disagreements in terms of officially promoted differences. This finding comes from extensive fieldwork on collective assaults upon Christians in Qena, Egypt. The Egyptian state favors Muslim citizens over Christian citizens, but in Qena local practices eclipsed this national hierarchy. The likelihood of attacks on Christians depended not on how the state categorized Egyptian governors (Muslim or Christian), but whether the governors reproduced Muslim primacy in their social relationships.
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| 7 |
ID:
109152
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