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| 1 |
ID:
102321
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| Publication |
Santa Barbara, Praeger, 2010.
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| Description |
xiv, 242p.
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| Series |
Contemporary military, strategic, and security issues
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| Standard Number |
9780313353260, hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 055743 | 358.1740973/SAM 055743 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
176355
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| Summary/Abstract |
A growing chorus of top U.S. military chiefs and bipartisan political leaders has voiced alarms on the proliferation of space threats. Yet, those same voices have been much quieter on the potential solutions, aside from calls for the United States to grow even stronger. It is time for the United States to return to its historical role and propose additional legally binding measures to enhance the security and stability of space, including space arms control, as part of a more holistic approach that includes voluntary measures as well.
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| 3 |
ID:
110123
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| 4 |
ID:
091877
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The change of U.S. administrations creates the opportunity for a broad assessment of the country's space policy, starting with some basic questions.
What should the goal of national space policies be? Are they trying to ensure freedom of action for certain states and not others? Does the definition of "freedom of action" need to be updated to reflect the increasing number of space actors? Should the focus be on establishing future cooperative efforts in space, or is space being preserved just for its own sake?
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| 5 |
ID:
080318
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
American officials have long proclaimed the importance of missile defence
cooperation with Russia, and bilateral cooperation on the issue is an obvious solution
to missile defence security dilemmas. What are the prospects for bilateral cooperation
on missile defence? The year 2007 witnessed an unprecedented missile defence controversy,
arising from American plans to base new defence installations in Europe,
ostensibly to counter the threat of long-range missiles from Iran. Russian leaders,
most prominently President Vladimir Putin, harshly criticized these plans for undermining
Russian security and demanded the United States drop its proposal. Instead,
Putin offered use of a Russian radar in Azerbaijan to detect missiles from Iran.
This article reviews two earlier attempts at bilateral cooperation: the Russian-
American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) and the Joint Data Exchange Center
(JDEC). One was cancelled. The other has been stalled in endless negotiation.
Neither example bodes well for future missile defence cooperation. The technical
and logistical difficulties of creating and operating bilateral Russian-American security
programs, when combined with residue of Cold War mistrust, make intensive
Russian-American missile defence cooperation extremely unlikely
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| 6 |
ID:
142098
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| Summary/Abstract |
Experts from U.S. government agencies that administer export controls of space systems and representatives from non-governmental organizations and think tanks were invited in December 2014 to participate in an invitation-only workshop co-hosted by the Secure World Foundation and Astroconsulting International to discuss export controls with a delegation of industry representatives from The Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies. The underlying question when working on export controls is, with the increased access to space and burgeoning role of the private sector in space, how do you regulate this and encourage industry without harming national security? It is difficult to do this while supporting the space industrial base, as export control is perceived as a necessary part of shoring U.S. national security and assuring a stable and predictable space environment. A serious challenge is determining which technologies should be controlled: where do you draw the line? This is particularly the case for space technologies, many of which are dual-use. Countries also have to be careful of unintended consequences. Export control restrictions are extremely challenging to get “just right” and, as a result, should be undertaken only after a considerable amount of discussion with all stakeholders, including input from industry, and when the government has a solid understanding of what it is trying to accomplish via export control protections. Otherwise, the domestic industry can unduly suffer with very little benefit to national security.
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