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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
111621
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| 2 |
ID:
186754
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| Summary/Abstract |
The debate over the genomic origin and direct source of the pandemic virus has intensified due to recent analyses concerning activities that had taken place in Wuhan prior to the initial outbreak and thereafter. Revisiting various aspects which are related to this development appears to be imperative, as certain early indications seem to converge with those analyses, while other recent analyses are contradictory.
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| 3 |
ID:
137461
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study attempts to profile China’s biological warfare programme (BWP), with special reference to biological weapons (BW) capabilities that exist in facilities affiliated with the defence establishment and the military. For that purpose, a wide variety of facilities affiliated with the defence establishment and with the military are reviewed and profiled. The outcome of that analysis points at 12 facilities affiliated with the defence establishment, plus 30 facilities affiliated with the PLA, that are involved in research, development, production, testing or storage of BW. This huge alignment might be regarded as superfluous, ostensibly; yet, considering the various factors discussed in the present study, the overall derived picture of the Chinese BW-related alignment is not at all surprising. The chances that an outstanding state like China would ignore new avenues of BW designing and deployment are a priori slim, if any. China, in all likelihood, is and will persist as a paramount BW possessor.
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| 4 |
ID:
080320
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The issue of a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities to halt progress towards
nuclear weapons is intensifying. This paper attempts to comprehend that possibility,
along with its implications. It does not deal with the prospects for a military strike
against Iran. But, since such an attack may take place, the present analysis inquires
into the feasibility of non-nuclear, WMD-based Iranian retaliatory options, strategically
and operationally, in case the attacker does not intend to eliminate those
options, in conjunction with targeting nuclear facilities. Beyond the scope of this
paper are the various ways to counter Iranian CBR weapons. This analysis supposes
the absence of Iranian nuclear weapons at present.
It is concluded that Iran endeavours to sustain rapid retaliatory capabilities by
non-nuclear WMD in case its nuclear facilities are attacked. Iranian leaders also
have the ability to choose to retaliate at once. A preemptive attack cannot focus exclusively
on Iran's nuclear establishment. To be effective, it also must incapacitate
Iranian CBR weapons, immediately before or in conjunction with the destruction
of nuclear facilities.
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| 5 |
ID:
132141
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Pakistan is a state party to the Biological Weapons Convention, yet at least part of its related outward conduct is rather exhibitory, aiming to foster the image of an obedient, sheer science- and protection-oriented profile. Although it is publicly accentuated that an ongoing Pakistani biological weapons (BW) programme cannot be proved, it is fairly clear that some Western intelligence agencies possess classified information that is highly supportive of such an active programme taking place in actuality. The biotechnological and biomedical infrastructures of Pakistan evidently enable such programme. An active BW programme in all likelihood commenced in Pakistan in the 1980s, and it possibly yielded a first generation BW arsenal by 1994. Otherwise, a first generation BW arsenal probably came into being during the second half of the 1990s or the first half of the 2000s. Ongoing development and upgrading have been observed, underlying a significant Pakistani subnuclear weapon of mass destruction capability.
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