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| 1 |
ID:
173393
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| Summary/Abstract |
From a local insurgent movement in the Malayan Emergency (1948–60), the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) transitioned into a cross-border one in the Second Emergency (1968–89) with regional links and implications. Due to the fixation on the Malayan Emergency period, the transition of the CPM insurgency from local to cross border during the Second Emergency period remains underexplored. This article shows how the CPM insurgency transitioned from a local one in Peninsular Malaysia to a protracted cross border conflict with a safe haven in Southern Thailand and how this significant development allowed the CPM to set the conditions of a persistent slow burn conflict in Southern Thailand that was difficult to defeat by security operations alone. This article also addresses how Malaysia, the counterinsurgent state dealt with the unique set of challenges associated with a cross-border insurgency that was subject to the ebb and flow ‘good neighbourly’ relations with Thailand. Finally, this article examines the negotiation process and how the lessons learnt from the failure of the Baling Peace Talks in 1955 were translated into an enduring peace at Haadyai in 1989.
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| 2 |
ID:
080343
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article will develop an explanatory theory on terrorist safe havens. Focusing on Islamist Terrorist networks, this article argues that four specific conditions are necessary for the establishment of a safe haven for Islamist terrorist networks: geographic features, weak governance, history of corruption and violence, and poverty. At the conclusion of the article, the developed theory is applied to the Tri-Border Area of South America (TBA), where the frontiers of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet, an area overlooked by the 9/11 National Commission Report's list of Islamist terrorists' safe havens.
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