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| 1 |
ID:
080418
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article seeks to explore the implications of Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) engagement with India, Pakistan and Iran. Not in terms of power-politics or as a counterbalance to the USA as this has been explored elsewhere, but what practical problems such an expanded organization could help solve, what opportunities it could realize, and how SCO's engagement in trade is a function of favourable political and bilateral developments in the region. It is argued here that the trade, infrastructure and energy sectors are of particular importance and that substantial potential gains could be realized if coordination is improved. Nevertheless, it is also recognized that China, Russia, Pakistan, India and Iran may have lower standards of democratic development and economic transparency than the West. What is the motivation behind the SCO's engagement with India, Pakistan and Iran? Should this engagement be conceived only in terms of balancing US unipolarity or are there legitimate concerns of increasing regional cooperation in Eurasia?
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| 2 |
ID:
130419
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Sino-Russian relations have swayed considerably in the second millennium. During the Yeltsin era, China-Russia relations were still strong, but this changed abruptly after Putin's accession to the presidency in 2000 and his initial pro-Western adventures. This was, in no small part, due to Russia's involvement in the war on terror, together with Russia's complicity in a US military presence in Central Asia which did not go down well in Beijing. Putin's domestic constituency found his swing into Washington's fold equally awkward, which created no small amount of criticism in Russia. Convinced that things could not get much worse, Putin's acceptance of NATO's expansion into the Baltics, his approval of US withdrawal from the ABM-treaty, and his quiet consent for an American military presence in Georgia raised additional fears in the Duma, within Russian public opinion, and to some extent among the Chinese. This was perceived as a direct surrender to American superiority and aggression, and it would not last for long.
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