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| 1 |
ID:
080459
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Yasukuni Shrine resonates with talismanic symbolism for both its critics and proponents and that is precisely why it is so controversial within Japan and between Japan and its neighbors. Controversy over Yasukuni is rooted in the broader historical debate about war memory, responsibility, and reconciliation. Competing narratives about this past send mixed signals to neighbors and prevent reconciliation. Despite Prime Minister Koizumi's six visits, Yasukuni is an awkward talisman and many Japanese, including conservatives, oppose these visits. The Shrine's image has been cast and no amount of artful repackaging will obscure its indelible links with Japan's discredited Imperial ideology and the costs it exacted. The Yasukuni dilemma involves shifting the focal point of official war remembrance away from the Shrine to a secular war memorial where people and officials can pay respect to the war dead free from political agendas and historical baggage
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| 2 |
ID:
080458
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Yasukuni Shrine is a site of contested nationalist politics in Japan and in neighbouring countries. Within Japan the status of the Shrine exists in a tension between public and private and religious and secular meanings. These tensions are given a specific focus in the context of the visits to the Shrine by Japanese Prime Ministers. The history of such visits is discussed and analysed, with particular attention given to the causes and consequences of the visits by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro between 2001 and 2006. It is argued that the controversies over the visits in Japan and elsewhere are best understood in the context of 'revisionist nationalism' in Japan. The reactions and nationalist problematics of the PRC and Taiwan with regard to the Yasukuni Shrine are then elaborated and analysed.
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| 3 |
ID:
080456
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Focusing on the construction and reconstruction process of anti-American icons in contemporary China, this paper compares the patterns of interactions between the Chinese government, intellectuals and general public during four events centering on China-US relations: the 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing, the early 2001 plane collision incident, the September 11 attacks, and the 2003 war in Iraq. The article suggests that the proliferation of anti-American icons in China does not only point towards the existence of anti-foreign ideologies. It is also a channel for different players in China to advance their personal and group interests. As long as tolerance from Beijing is signalled, much nationalist rhetoric is a coded way of directing limited dissent at the Chinese state itself, but how exactly the Chinese public hold the "nationalist flags" - which is allowed by the party-state - against the "red flags" of the same regime remains relatively unexplored. Filling up such an intellectual vacuum is the central focus of this paper
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| 4 |
ID:
080460
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Prime Minister Koizumi's six consecutive annual visits to Yasukuni shrine played a key role in initiating a new phase of domestic citizen political mobilization not seen since the early 1970s. This paper is based on field research during the Koizumi years (2001-2006) centering on domestic groups that conduct activities in "protection" of or "opposition" to Yasukuni shrine. As a study of street-based politics, this paper seeks to uncover the processes, strategies, and outcomes of citizen responses to elite political action at Yasukuni Shrine as well as explore meaning of their actions within the context of Japan's democratic polity
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| 5 |
ID:
080457
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
With deeper integration into the global economy and expanded penetration by multinational firms and other nonChinese actors following accession to the WTO, skills in bureaucratic entrepreneurship are not likely to be sufficient by themselves to bring about China's sustainable development. In today's interdependent and highly competitive trade, economic-cooperation, and resource-limited environment, sustainable development requires that subnational managers also possess transnational competence in collaborating with, negotiating with, and transforming foreign counterparts. However, survey research among Chinese executives based in Shanghai revealed that only a small proportion of the reporting current and future managers recognized the growing importance for China of an interculturally competent workforce. Without increased attention to enhancing the transnational competence of government and state-enterprise managers, peaceful and ecologically sound development will be difficult to sustain given the demands of multinational production chains, global resource constraints, and the challenges involved in managing transnational relations in the interest of China's long-term economic progress.
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