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| 1 |
ID:
080505
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Stephen Brooks' Producing Security is a very fine book that advances our understanding of globalization and of the links between economics and national security. In this paper I evaluate favorably and explore the frontiers of the book's chief contributions: its elucidation of the globalization of production, its illustration of the novelty of that phenomenon, and its consideration of the significance of this for world politics. I then raise one basic dissent, challenging the idea that the globalization of production has indeed altered the calculus of conflict - though my claim is not that the argument is wrong, but rather, that it is very considerably oversold. A final section offers some hypotheses on how the processes of globalization more generally may be altering the calculus of conflict for reasons complementary to, but largely distinct from, those emphasized in Producing Security
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| 2 |
ID:
080507
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Contemporary economic globalization differs from past increases in global commerce, especially because modern foreign direct investment and systems integration techniques allow factories in different countries to specialize in the design and production of parts rather than complete products. Stephen Brooks has argued, based on both liberal and realist logics, that this new form of globalization might bring a "commercial peace," at least among the great powers. But economic globalization did not simply appear by itself. Firms and governments made conscious decisions through a process of systems integration and strategic planning that led to a wide variety of international economic relationships. That diversity of economic connections combines with the variety of strategic situations in the international environment - variations in geography, national intentions, policy history, etc. - to suggest a range of possible constraints on countries' offensive capability and on the prospects for economic gains from conquest. As has always been the case, conquest in the future will sometimes prove valuable and other times will not. Globalization does not imply the dawn of an era of commercial peace.
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| 3 |
ID:
080503
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2007.
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Nuclear weapons' defenders claim that they lower the risk of war, at the price of devastation if war breaks out. Sooner or later, however, on a realist analysis, catastrophic nuclear war is sure to come. Nuclear deterrence thus buys us a better chance of dying in bed, while each post-holocaust generation will have to pick up the pieces. If the nuclear optimists are wrong, hoping to spread or perpetuate nuclear deterrence is foolish; but if they are right, it is exploitative. Like big cars and cheap flights, nuclear deterrence benefits us at the expense of future generations. States that do not already have the bomb should not get it. Britain and France should consider disarmament, while Russia and the United States should slash their arsenals. Minimum deterrence should be equally stable, but most nuclear optimists, being neorealists who hold that war will continue, should want deep cuts even if it is not.
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| 4 |
ID:
080508
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This symposium has provided a priceless opportunity to advance debate on how global commerce influences international security. Of particular importance is that these articles help clarify exactly how the globalization of production affects great power security relations. My article comprises four parts, the first of which outlines the current state of the debate on how the globalization of production influences security and discusses why further research on this topic is needed. Section two examines Jonathan Kirshner's article, which helpfully shows why my conclusion that the globalization of production is stabilizing ultimately pertains to the severity of great power war, not its initiation. Section three discusses Jonathan Caverely's article and demonstrates how almost all the critical issues raised by Caverley are consistent with Producing Security. Section four turns to Eugene Gholz's contribution, which explores the boundary conditions of some of my arguments and usefully underscores that the globalization of production does not influence the benefits of conquest in advanced countries nearly as strongly in the short-term as it does in the long-term.
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| 5 |
ID:
080504
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
American policy toward China during the early Cold War has long been considered as a prime anomaly to balance of power theory. Many realists have argued that domestic forces caused a confrontational policy, overriding structural imperative to accommodate China to balance the stronger Soviet power in Asia. Refuting the domestic explanation, I argue that balance of power consideration primarily determined the U.S. policy. Under the powerful pressure of bipolar competition, the Truman administration persistently pursued a realist policy of forming an alliance with Communist China, or at least neutralizing it, through accommodation in order to balance the Soviet Union in Asia. This policy was based on the assessment of Soviet superiority in Asia. However, my analysis of the power structure shows that there was little structural incentive for China to cooperate with the United States against the Soviet Union because the latter was in a somewhat disadvantageous position globally and had limited offensive capabilities in Asia. Further, Chinese leaders perceived the United States as the superior power in bipolarity. Consequently, China formed an alliance with the Soviet Union to check the United States according to its own balance of power logic
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| 6 |
ID:
080506
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Liberal theory asserts that the need for cost-effective, technologically advanced weapons requires the United States to acquiesce to increasing defense globalization even as this restrains U.S. power. Realist logic dictates that the United States should resist defense liberalization to retain its self-sufficiency. This is a false choice; the United States encourages defense globalization in order to extend its international political influence. This paper proposes an alternate theory of technological hegemony that explains the U.S. policy of massive R&D investment in both the late Cold War and the current era of American preponderance. Modern weapons' complexity and economies of scale tend to produce monopolies, and the value chain for the production of these monopolistic goods is dominated by the systems integration techniques of prime contracting firms. In turn these prime contractors remain largely enthralled by U.S. market power. The United States gains international influence by controlling the distribution of these weapons. Put simply, technology with international political effects is likely to have international political origins
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