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| 1 |
ID:
174718
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| 2 |
ID:
109594
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
While securitization studies have paid considerable attention to the moral value of desecuritization, they have paid almost no attention to the morality of securitization. In this article, I attempt to rectify that situation by proposing a revision of securitization theory that specifies three criteria that - if fulfilled at the same time - would render a securitization morally right. The criteria are: (1) that there is an objective existential threat; (2) that the referent object of security is morally legitimate; and (3) that the security response is appropriate to the threat in question. Although what is suggested here is considerably removed from the Copenhagen School's original securitization theory, it is akin to that framework insofar as it retains the functional distinction between the security analyst and the securitizing actor. Indeed, the development of criteria that determine the moral rightness of securitization is analogous to the Copenhagen School's devising criteria that determine both the existence and the success of securitization.
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| 3 |
ID:
161268
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| 4 |
ID:
109586
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article argues that there are a number of concepts of politics in play in the current debates on securitization theory and that greater awareness regarding these conceptual differences helps clarify not only theoretical differences but also the possibilities for new theoretical development and reflection. The article identifies three conversations on politics: first, a conversation on how politics concerns action and intentionality; second, a conversation on the modern organization of politics, spheres and sectors; and, third, a conversation on the relationship between politics, ethics and science. Where the first and third conversations refer to politics as an act, in the second conversation politics is inherently tied to the institutional or spatial structures of government - the state, the public, the political field, spheres, sectors or function.
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| 5 |
ID:
092347
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article is devoted to an analysis of cyber security, a concept that arrived on the post-Cold War agenda in response to a mixture of technological innovations and changing geopolitical conditions. Adopting the framework of securitization theory, the article theorizes cyber security as a distinct sector with a particular constellation of threats and referent objects. It is held that "network security" and "individual security" are significant referent objects, but that their political importance arises from connections to the collective referent objects of "the state,""society,""the nation," and "the economy." These referent objects are articulated as threatened through three distinct forms of securitizations: hypersecuritization, everyday security practices, and technifications. The applicability of the theoretical framework is then shown through a case-study of what has been labeled the first war in cyber space against Estonian public and commercial institutions in 2007.
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| 6 |
ID:
157539
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Securitization theory has developed into a fruitful research program on the construction of security threats. The theory has experienced growing sophistication, and empirical studies have produced stimulating insights on issues as varied as the politics of immigration, health, climate change, or cybersecurity. Understanding how social issues become perceived as threats seems timelier than ever given the rise in securitizing narratives in recent political elections across the globe. We propose that this research agenda would benefit from broadening its methodological diversity. In particular, the use of experiments could complement existing methods in securitization theory, mitigate some of the program’s methodological weaknesses, and help explain when securitizing moves are likely to succeed or fail.
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| 7 |
ID:
147970
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper is concerned with two interrelated problems in the Copenhagen School’s (CS’s) securitization theory. The first is the challenge that non-exceptional security polices pose to the theory, which starts from the assumption that securitization is ‘successful’ only when extraordinary emergency measures are adopted. The second arises not from what factors define securitization’s ‘success’, but rather from who does so. Securitization theory suffers from a constructivist deficit because the criterion for the ‘success’ of securitization is set by scholars, whereas a more ‘radically constructivist [theory] regarding security’ would require practitioners to be in charge of defining the ‘success’ of securitization. The paper offers a solution to both of these problems by suggesting that securitization is ‘successful’ only when (1) the identification of a threat that justifies a response (securitizing move) is followed by (2) a change of behaviour (action) by a relevant agent (that is, the securitizing actor or someone instructed by the same), and also (3) the action taken is justified by the securitizing actor with reference to the threat they identified and declared in the securitizing move. It goes on to reject the ideas of a sanctioning audience and of the insistence on existential threats as also set by the CS.
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| 8 |
ID:
161267
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| 9 |
ID:
186563
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South Korea's persistent enmity towards its erstwhile colonizer Japan has been a compelling topic of East Asian international relations scholarship for decades. This article argues that the historical evolution of South Korea's democracy offers a vital and overlooked piece of this puzzle. Given that it emerged from one of the most virulently anti-communist dictatorships of the Cold War period, in a society facing an ongoing threat from communist North Korea, any left-of-center opposition movement faced an uphill battle against severe anti-communism. In such circumstances, the only way for a leftist opposition party to survive was by pitting its stronger anti-Japan reputation against conservatives’ anti-communism. After South Korea's democracy stabilized, liberals tried and failed to overturn the anti-leftist institutions left over from the Cold War and then sought equilibrium through parallel rhetoric targeting pro-Japanese elements. Today, neither left nor right can afford to allow a final amicable settlement with its respective target of antagonism. Through analyses of domestic political rhetoric targeting alleged pro-Japanese or pro-communist elements, this paper demonstrates how these competing antagonisms achieved an uneasy equilibrium that undergirds South Korean political dynamics to this day.
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| 10 |
ID:
175133
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Technology hype is an important concept in business, marketing, and science and technology studies, but it is rarely related to security studies. What is technology hype? How does it relate to national security? And to what effect? This article examines rational and performative perspectives on technology hype as either a kind of exaggeration or expectant discourse. Adopting the latter view, I compare and contrast hype cycles with threat inflation and securitization theory. I then sketch my own theoretical propositions about technology hype as being common in national security, with variable degrees of acceptance, familiar content, and significant consequences. A case study on quantum technologies provides proof of concept. I find ample evidence of hype over quantum computers, communications, and sensors; audience acceptance in the national security community varies with familiarity; and consequential decisions appear to follow. While cyclical expectations suggest the need for caution when citing quantum technologies in support of quantum approaches to international relations, a middle-range theory about technology hype provides useful insight into security practice.
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| 11 |
ID:
109587
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article seeks to offer a way forward in discussions about the status of securitization theory. In my reading, this debate has been inhibited by the difficulty of finding an appropriate version of 'understanding/explanation' that would be consistent with the meta-theoretical commitments of a post-structuralist theory. By leaving 'explanation' and/or all versions of causality to the positivist other, the Copenhagen School also left its own explanatory status often implicit, or only negatively defined. Instead, the present article claims that the explanatory theory used in securitization research de facto relies on causal mechanisms that are non-positivistically conceived. Using the appropriate methodological literature renders this explanatory status explicit, exposing the theory's non-positivist causality and thus, hopefully, enhancing its empirical theory.
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| 12 |
ID:
174773
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Drawing from securitization theory and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), this article examines how the Singaporean government has “securitized” cyberspace governance. It contributes value-add to the existing literature on securitization theory by evaluating the specific backgrounds and preexisting beliefs that securitizing actors bring with them to the securitization process. Taking the case of Singapore, this paper focuses on the military elites turned civilian politicans and policymakers that have been tasked with cyberspace governance. A discourse analysis shows how terminologies describing cyberspace as an “existential” issue and key personnel appointments with significant military backgrounds reflect the prevalance of military elites, terminologies, strategies that have become embedded within domestic cybersecurity governance structures. The use of military-style concepts such as “digital ranges” and “war games” in Singapore mirrors global financial industry trends where military-derived terminology has become widespread in preparing for cyber-attacks on critical information infrastructure. Two key focus areas of cyberspace governance are evaluated: online content regulation of Internet and social media networks, and legislation to protect critical information infrastructure. The paper concludes by discussing a range of concerns raised by the target “audience” of securitization processes, such as civil society and information infrastructure providers.
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| 13 |
ID:
109593
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
So far, securitization analysis has proceeded on the basis of an assumption that there are sectoral differences between securitization dynamics. However, sectors in this context were primarily seen as analytical 'lenses', as complexity-reducing cuts through a complex social reality. In this article, we first reflect on the ontological status of 'sectors'. Do they represent functionally differentiated realms of world politics or world society, or do sectors and functional realms need to be separated from one another clearly? After giving a short introduction to the notion of 'functional differentiation' in international relations and briefly reflecting on the ontological/analytical distinction, we scrutinize the relation between sectors and functionally differentiated realms of society. Although sectors hang together with functional differentiation, much depends on the version of functional differentiation theory used. In the communication theoretical version, securitization would be firmly located within the political system. References to functionally specific sectors would then - contra Waltz - point not only towards functional differentiation between the political and other functionally defined realms of (international) society, but also towards ongoing functional differentiation within the (international) political system.
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| 14 |
ID:
157523
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This article addresses the Israeli demand during the 2013–14 peace negotiations that Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state within the context of securitization theory. Contrary to many readings, this article argues the demand was not merely a tactical ploy to delay or derail the peace process but rather was part of a broader process of making Israel's Jewish identity a matter of national security. The application of securitization theory beyond the liberal nation-state is also examined.
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| 15 |
ID:
109588
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article confronts the basic idea of securitization with the concept of translation. By critically examining Wæver's deliberately traditionalist and essentialist conceptualization of security and his notion of a distinctly speech-act-theoretical approach to securitization, it develops a processual refinement that reads articulations of security as translations. I claim that this conceptual transposition has the potential to open the current securitization discourse to an alternative perspective and to new avenues of research on the travel, localization and/or gradual evolution/transformation of security meanings.
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| 16 |
ID:
103666
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article provides a framework for the study of visual securitization, that is, when images constitute something or someone as threatened and in need of immediate defense or when securitizing actors argue that images 'speak security'. To study security politics is to focus on the public constitution of threats and dangers; to study visual securitization, therefore, requires an analysis not just of the image as a free-standing entity, but of the ways it is constituted through spoken and written discourse. To analyze the process of visual securitization, this article advances an inter-visual/intertextual model consisting of four components: the visual itself, its immediate intertextual context, the wider policy discourse, and the constitutions of the image. Three additional sets of theoretical arguments deepen this model by pointing to the specificity of the image as comprised through immediacy, circulability, and ambiguity, the strategies of depiction that images employ, and the genres through which images are brought to the audience. The applicability of the theoretical framework is illustrated through a case study of one of the most conspicuous cases of visual securitization: the Muhammad Cartoon Crisis.
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| 17 |
ID:
165443
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This note incorporates securitization scholarship into the study of deterrence. I argue that deterrence is a securitizing move, and it is embedded in and affected by a broader assemblage of securitizing moves performed by different actors. These include the deterrer, the putative challenger, and various third parties. Linking deterrence theory and securitization theory opens up promising directions for theory and research. Among other things, it provides a way for interpretative scholars to engage with debates within traditional deterrence scholarship—such as those regarding deterrence success, deterrence credibility, and the effects of the use of force on these dynamics. It also highlights often-overlooked issues in the study of deterrence. These include processes through which actors come to adopt this strategy. It also includes processes through which the threat to deterrence itself becomes a powerful political tool for mobilizing support to different strategic moves.
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| 18 |
ID:
080572
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2007.
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While other forms of transnational crime in the Asia Pacific have been securitized - that is, represented by policy elites and security actors as crucial or existential threats to national and regional security - transnational environmental crime has been un(der)securitized. It warrants little mention in regional security statements or the security concerns of individual countries. Yet the consequences of activities such as illegal logging and timber smuggling, wildlife smuggling, the black market in ozone-depleting substances and dumping of other forms of hazardous wastes and chemical fit the (in)security profile applied to other forms of transnational crime. This article surveys the main forms of transnational environmental crime in the Asia Pacific and assesses the 'fit' with a 'crime as security' framework. It shows that transnational environmental crime generates the kinds of 'pernicious effects on regional stability and development, the maintenance of the rule of law and the welfare of the region's people' that the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime identified as matters of serious concern. The analysis draws on securitization theory to understand the lack of a 'securitizing move' and to explain why security elites do not believe the problem warrants serious attention. The possibilities explored here include intellectual inertia, confusion about referent objects, institutional incapacity, mixed policy signals and the exclusion of environmental expertise from a closed community of security elites
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| 19 |
ID:
109590
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| Publication |
2011.
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This article makes a claim for re-engaging the concept of 'act' in the study of securitization. While much has been written about the discursive and communicative aspects of securitizing, the concept of 'act' that contains much of the politicality of the speech-act approach to security has been relatively ignored. The task of re-engaging 'acts' is particularly pertinent in the contemporary context, in which politically salient speech acts are heavily displaced by securitizing practices and devices that appear as banal, little security nothings. The main purpose of the article is to begin the framing of a research agenda that asks what political acts can be in diffuse security processes that efface securitizing speech acts.
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