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1 |
ID:
160638
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Summary/Abstract |
The rise of China has been fuelled by a massive military modernisation programme relying, in large part, on the acquisition of foreign military equipment. The question of how the world’s major powers define their arms transfer policies towards China is therefore crucially important. This article makes two original contributions. First, drawing on neoclassical realism, it proposes an explanatory framework integrating international and domestic factors to explain variations in major powers’ arms transfers. Second, based on a large body of elite interviews and diplomatic cables, it offers the first comprehensive comparison of American, British, French and Russian arms transfer policies towards China since the end of the Cold War.
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2 |
ID:
189671
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Summary/Abstract |
Every year, more than $100 billion worth of weapons are transferred to countries and other buyers all over the globe. Most of these international transactions happened in the shadows until 1991, when there was a concerted effort to ensure a measure of transparency about who is buying, who is selling, and what weapons are involved in the world’s deadliest conflicts.
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3 |
ID:
107778
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Publication |
Sweden, SIPRI, 2011.
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Description |
vii, 43p.
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Series |
SIPRI policy paper no. 29
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Standard Number |
9789185114665
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
056281 | 333.790951/JAK 056281 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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4 |
ID:
107779
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Publication |
Sweden, SIPRI, 2011.
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Description |
vii, 42p.
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Series |
SIPRI policy paper no. 28
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Standard Number |
9789185114658
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
056280 | 382.456234/HOL 056280 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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5 |
ID:
097187
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6 |
ID:
121703
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
On April 2, the UN General Assembly adopted the text of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by a vote of 156-3, with 22 abstentions.[1] After the treaty is opened for signature early this month, countries will sign it and prepare for its ratification according to their national procedures for considering treaties. The ATT requires ratification by 50 states before it can enter into force.
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7 |
ID:
095493
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Publication |
2010.
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Summary/Abstract |
This essay examines recent developments in UN Register of Conventional Arms and their implications for the norm of transparency in international arms transfers. It focuses in particular upon data made available in national reports to the Register for years 2005-2008 and the outcome of the 2009 meetings of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the 'continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development'. The paper notes that the norm of transparency in international arms transfers is not under serious threat despite the decline in reporting to the Register. It also suggests that despite some positive developments in 2003 and 2006 with regard to the prospects of expanding the Register's scope, and in the process increasing its relevance, the 2009 GGE was unable to recommend the creation of a new category in the Register for reporting international transfers of small arms and light weapons.
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8 |
ID:
083001
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Publication |
Stockholms, SIPRI, 2008.
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Description |
ix, 58p.
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Series |
SIPRI policy paper; 22
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Standard Number |
9789185114580
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
053753 | 355.82/HOL 053753 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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9 |
ID:
115280
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
The UN conference to negotiate an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) concluded on 27 July 2012 without reaching consensus on the text of a draft treaty and saw both the US and Russia calling for more time to negotiate. The ATT process marks the latest in a series of attempts to insert human security concerns into arms export controls. The setback in July raises questions about the current level of international support for the human security agenda, as well as the relative power of different actors to shape global governance structures. This article locates the ATT negotiations in the broader history of multilateral efforts to regulate the international arms trade, from the 1890 Brussels Act to post-Cold War initiatives. The historical record shows that such efforts are more likely to succeed if they are negotiated or imposed by major arms exporters. The introduction of human security concerns, as well as the merging of export control and arms control agendas, went some way towards reversing this trend. In particular, it created a broad international coalition of supportive states and NGOs from the global North and South. Yet disagreements over the purpose of an ATT remained. The draft ATT included human security provisions, but China, Russia, the US and a number of emerging powers ensured that state security considerations remained paramount in decision-making on arms exports. The US was the first major actor to announce its unwillingness to sign the draft ATT in July 2012 and two alternative interpretations of US actions are considered. The article concludes by considering the options available to supporters of the ATT process following the 2012 conference and examines the notion that the ATT campaign has become an initiative 'out of its time', one that might have had success in the 1990s but not in current circumstances.
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10 |
ID:
080615
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Publication |
Sweden, SIPRI, 2007.
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Description |
xiv, 56p.
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Standard Number |
9789185114566
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
052977 | 341.584/FRU 052977 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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