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| 1 |
ID:
142472
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| Summary/Abstract |
Boundary-making in the Karakoram–Himalayan borderlands has found a diverse set of actors and expressions over time. Legacies from colonial borders are part of contemporary disputes about affiliation, participation, and space. Three aspects are addressed in this paper: first, the debate about ‘natural’ and ‘scientific’ boundaries for purposes of colonial territorial acquisition; second, postcolonial debates in the recent renaming game in Gilgit-Baltistan and its implications; and third, the attitudes of actors in exile and geopolitical players claiming to represent the aspirations of the inhabitants of Gilgit-Baltistan. The three perspectives reveal opportunities and constraints in border regimes that reflect power structures, internal and external modes of interference, and participation.
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| 2 |
ID:
103575
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| 3 |
ID:
118550
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| 4 |
ID:
150414
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| 5 |
ID:
121797
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Empirical analyses of domestic legal traditions in the social science literature demonstrate that common law states have better economic freedoms, stronger investor protection, more developed capital markets, and better property rights protection than states with civil law, Islamic law, or mixed legal traditions. This article expands upon the literature by examining the relationship between domestic legal traditions and human rights practices. The primary hypothesis is that common law states have better human rights practices on average than civil law, Islamic law, or mixed law states because the procedural features of common law such as the adversarial trial system, the reliance on oral argumentation, and stare decisis result in greater judicial independence and protection of individual rights in these legal systems. We also examine how the quality of a state's legal system influences repression focusing on colonial legacy, judicial independence, and the rule of law. A global cross-national analysis of state-years from 1976 to 2006 shows that states with common law traditions engage in better human rights practices than states with other legal systems. This result holds when controlling for the quality of the legal system and standard explanations for states' human rights practices (economic growth, regime type, population size, military regime, and war involvement).
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| 6 |
ID:
118193
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| 7 |
ID:
190566
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2021.
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| Description |
xxv, 476p.: figures, tableshbk
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| Standard Number |
9780199460489
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 060379 | 954.04/MIT 060379 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 8 |
ID:
080668
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The recent "headscarf affair" has created a divisive national crisis in several European countries. Like Turkey, France and Germany have introduced legislation prohibiting "conspicuous" religious symbols in government institutions. The article argues that interpretations of 'Muslim' female head covering as a sign of oppression ignore their resemblance to European symbols of ideal womanhood. The question of the 'ethnicity' of the symbol is thus elusive, and the assertion of categorical difference can be challenged on the level of citizenship law. Recent amendments to German citizenship law based on jus sanguinis have eased immigrants' adoption of citizenship, diminishing the contrast with the French jus soli. Thus, in Germany there has been a shift from the emphasis on the transmission of substance toward display of cultural competence through other forms of embodiment. In both Germany and France, in key social locations of state reproduction, national belonging and loyalty to the state must be demonstrated through linguistic competence and modes of bodily performance that mainly focus on women
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| 9 |
ID:
146386
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| 10 |
ID:
158160
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2018.
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| Description |
xx, 532p.: figures, tableshbk
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| Standard Number |
9780199480135
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:1,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059355 | 355.033054/GAN 059355 | Main | On Shelf | Reference books | |
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| 11 |
ID:
159385
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the status of tribal communities in central India through the lens of structural violence. In the process, a new and normatively grounded definition of violence is put forward which addresses weaknesses in the original definition proposed by Johan Galtung. The paper connects this new definition of structural violence to developmentalist and capitalist ideology, frameworks that benefit tribal communities by some empirical measures, but which must be recognised as profoundly violent in the normative contexts of those communities. Adivasis are caught between the competing imperatives of the Indian state's different and overlapping stages of modernist development: the remnants of the old colonial ‘civilising’ mission, a post-colonial nationalist industrialism and a post-industrial urge toward conservation. I argue that Galtung's definition is ill-suited to the task of describing this type of post-colonial structural violence, and that my definition solves this problem by accounting for the violence of conflicting normative frameworks.
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| 12 |
ID:
175071
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent months there has been an effort to reignite debate about the suitability of a federal parliamentary system and argue that it needs to be replaced by a centralized presidential form of government. This has led to sharp reactions from those who favour a continuation of parliamentary government in Pakistan especially with regard to the strong federal provisions of the Eighteenth Amendment (2010) to the Pakistani Constitution, which granted greater autonomy to the provinces and undid many of the changes imposed by military rulers. This paper examines the original version of this debate from Pakistan's experience in the 1950s and 1960s with the aim of identifying and discussing the rationales of those in favor of a presidential Pakistan and the price that the country paid for undermining parliamentary government.
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