| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
recent years, a number of western donor countries have recognized
the utility of, and need for, more robust and well-articulated national security frameworks. Two interesting phenomena have contributed to the awarenessof such a need. Firstly, the recognition by these countries when assisting in
the design and expenditure of developmental assistance programmes that,
in many states emerging from conflict, a national security 'system' of sorts
becomes a priority. Such a 'security system' will not work if left to develop
at municipal or provincial levels within a state, without some parallel efforts
towards establishing top-level national ownership behind the security
agenda. Whether such ideas become embodied within a peace agreement or
within the mandate of a new or provisional government, it is essential that
the core foundations for national security provide strategic guidance for the
range of other national instruments responsible for implementing security
policy. More recently, in a number of international assistance programmes,
donor states have encouraged the development of national security frameworks
as a way of guiding the evolution of other programme areas (for example
in Sierra Leone, Uganda and Jamaica). Whilst such developments are
encouraging, they have also served as subtle reminders to some donor
governments that there is room to adopt a similar practice in reviewing the
way in which their own governments develop national security policy.
Secondly, in the wake of a broader human security agenda - and following
the progress made towards adapting and expanding roles and responsibilities
across governments in support of international security priorities - some
analysts and senior policymakers are making more efforts to think 'strategically'
about national security in order to link up these expanded areas under
a more concise central policy remit. Whereas some states already in possession
of a national security architecture have used existing frameworks to
guide their thinking on broader issues of security, others without such frameworks
rely on existing 'joined-up' or 'whole of government' processes to
strategize collectively and more coherently.
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