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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
080727
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A common argument is that the United States deployed inadequate forces
to secure Iraq. This paper attempts to back that argument with empiricalevidence. Evidence collected in Al Anbar province strongly suggests that a
larger number of forces would have reduced insurgent activity in 2004 and
2005. During this period, suppressing large-scale insurgent activity required
directly protecting the population through traditional counterinsurgency
techniques, such as patrolling, manning outposts, and running checkpoints.
Unfortunately, scarcity of US forces meant that such labor-intensive operations
could not be sustained in key areas. Some have argued that the United
States should have focused on building indigenous forces as a means of
providing the necessary numbers. Yet indigenous forces offered no
alternative. Even with embedded advisors and air support, indigenous forces
could not survive against a vibrant insurgency sustained by local support.
Nothing substituted for large numbers of US ground forces. This conclusion
places scarcity of US forces as a major cause of the fiasco in Iraq.
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| 2 |
ID:
080726
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
An unconventional way to analyse the current counter-insurgency (COIN)
operations is to look at the importance of
time,
as a concept, in such wars.
The thesis of this study is to prove that a thorough understanding of the time
aspects and issues in COIN campaigns is a precondition necessary to define
a clear political agenda, an operational tempo, an exit strategy in order definitely
to win 'hearts and minds' and to reach the political objective. The study
first points out the reasons why COIN operations are time-sensitive, then
the time-related issues in today's COIN campaigns before illustrating this
analytical approach with the current conflict in Afghanistan as a case study.
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| 3 |
ID:
080725
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
There is a widely held perception among members of the armed forces and
others that the military is 'legally encircled'; in other words, that regulation
and litigation by civilian actors, both domestic and international, are
preventing the military from doing its job. By contrast, this paper suggests
that the legal encirclement metaphor is misleading. The metaphor
obscures what is more accurately described as interaction between the military
and civilian legal actors, and a balancing process which occurs between
the need for distinct operational norms and the need to operate within
evolving international and domestic norms. Furthermore, the 'legal encirclement'
view ignores the fact that courts and lawmakers have been largely
deferential to - perhaps overly so - the military's core function of combat.
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| 4 |
ID:
080728
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The British government demonstrated the political and military nature of
chemical weapons by making crucial decisions about offensive gas use
during World War I: opting to use gas, refraining from escalating the gas war
chemically and also geographically, and rejecting the Red Cross's appeal to
abandon gas. Each decision required weighing the goal of victory (and thus
military necessity) with a desire to maintain Britain's reputation as a
civilized nation, despite common recognition of the brutal nature of the
conflict and of the atrocious character of gas. In the end, Britain successfully
balanced her concerns, shaping chemical warfare in its inaugural
conflict
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| 5 |
ID:
080724
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
recent years, a number of western donor countries have recognized
the utility of, and need for, more robust and well-articulated national security frameworks. Two interesting phenomena have contributed to the awarenessof such a need. Firstly, the recognition by these countries when assisting in
the design and expenditure of developmental assistance programmes that,
in many states emerging from conflict, a national security 'system' of sorts
becomes a priority. Such a 'security system' will not work if left to develop
at municipal or provincial levels within a state, without some parallel efforts
towards establishing top-level national ownership behind the security
agenda. Whether such ideas become embodied within a peace agreement or
within the mandate of a new or provisional government, it is essential that
the core foundations for national security provide strategic guidance for the
range of other national instruments responsible for implementing security
policy. More recently, in a number of international assistance programmes,
donor states have encouraged the development of national security frameworks
as a way of guiding the evolution of other programme areas (for example
in Sierra Leone, Uganda and Jamaica). Whilst such developments are
encouraging, they have also served as subtle reminders to some donor
governments that there is room to adopt a similar practice in reviewing the
way in which their own governments develop national security policy.
Secondly, in the wake of a broader human security agenda - and following
the progress made towards adapting and expanding roles and responsibilities
across governments in support of international security priorities - some
analysts and senior policymakers are making more efforts to think 'strategically'
about national security in order to link up these expanded areas under
a more concise central policy remit. Whereas some states already in possession
of a national security architecture have used existing frameworks to
guide their thinking on broader issues of security, others without such frameworks
rely on existing 'joined-up' or 'whole of government' processes to
strategize collectively and more coherently.
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