| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Pakistan military has long been considered the one institution in the country that functions sufficiently well to deliver international objectives. It has consequently been the partner of choice for many states, not least the United States. A reading of the history of Pakistan, however, shows that successive military regimes have each led Pakistan into crisis, to the detriment of partners' interests; and far from guaranteeing the cohesion and stability of Pakistan, military rule has more often imperilled it. This article offers an assessment of military rule under General Pervez Musharraf and argues that the unprecedented support offered to Musharraf by the United States, both in material terms and in terms of the political space afforded him, has brought Pakistan once again to the brink of disaster. The lessons are clear: the United States, and the West more generally, needs to place support for democracy and justice in Pakistan above support for narrow conceptions of order, and needs to privilege support for the people of Pakistan over that of support for Pakistan's military government
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