Query Result Set
SLIM21 Home
Advanced Search
My Info
Browse
Arrivals
Expected
Reference Items
Journal List
Proposals
Media List
Rules
ActiveUsers:425
Hits:19938104
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
Help
Topics
Tutorial
Advanced search
Hide Options
Sort Order
Natural
Author / Creator, Title
Title
Item Type, Author / Creator, Title
Item Type, Title
Subject, Item Type, Author / Creator, Title
Item Type, Subject, Author / Creator, Title
Publication Date, Title
Items / Page
5
10
15
20
Modern View
FOWLER, JAMES H
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
134979
Decision maker preferences for international legal cooperation
/ Hafner-Burton, Emilie M; LeVeck, Brad L ; Victor, David G; Fowler, James H
Victor, David G
Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract
Why do some decision makers prefer big multilateral agreements while others prefer cooperation in small clubs? Does enforcement encourage or deter institutional cooperation? We use experiments drawn from behavioral economics and cognitive psychology—along with a substantive survey focused on international trade—to illustrate how two behavioral traits (patience and strategic reasoning) of individuals who play key roles in negotiating and ratifying an international treaty shape their preferences for how treaties are designed and whether they are ratified. Patient subjects were more likely to prefer treaties with larger numbers of countries (and larger long-term benefits), as were subjects with the skill to anticipate how others will respond over multiple iterations of strategic games. The presence of an enforcement mechanism increased subjects' willingness to ratify treaties; however, strategic reasoning had double the effect of adding enforcement to a trade agreement: more strategic subjects were particularly likely to favor ratifying the agreement. We report these results for a sample of 509 university students and also show how similar patterns are revealed in a unique sample of ninety-two actual US policy elites. Under some conditions certain types of university student convenience samples can be useful for revealing elite-dominated policy preferences—different types of people in the same situation may prefer to approach decision-making tasks and reason through trade-offs in materially different ways
Links
'Full Text'
In Basket
Export
2
ID:
080822
Tournament of party decision rules
/ Fowler, James H; Laver, Michael
Fowler, James H
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2008.
Summary/Abstract
Following Axelrod's tournaments for strategies in the repeat-play prisoner's dilemma, we ran a ``tournament of party decision rules'' in a dynamic agent-based model of party competition. We asked researchers to submit rules for selecting party positions in a two-dimensional policy space, pitting each rule against all others in a suite of long-running simulations. The most successful rule combined a number of striking features: satisficing rather than maximizing in the short run, being ``parasitic'' on choices made by successful rules, and being hardwired not to attack other agents using the same rule. In a second suite of simulations in a more evolutionary setting in which the selection probability of a rule was a function of the previous success of agents using the same rule, the rule winning the original tournament pulled even further ahead of the competition
Key Words
Agent-Based Model
;
Computer Tournament
;
Party Competition
;
Parties and Elections
In Basket
Export