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| 1 |
ID:
121237
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the first two decades of the Cold War, especially during the
administration of the United States presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-
1961) and Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969), relations between the US and
Indonesia were marked with suspicion, ambiguity, and antagonism. This
was in part due to the failures of many US policymakers in understanding-
let alone respecting-Indonesia's culture and politics, especially as they
manifested in the political views and personality of Indonesia's first
president, Sukarno. Failing to see Sukarno as a Javanese-Indonesian leader
whose views on domestic and international politics stemmed from his
Javanese background, many Cold War US policymakers considered him a
communist demagogue who threatened US interests and world peace.
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| 2 |
ID:
128629
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The author consider the potential of cultural misunderstanding to have an adverse effect on the type of operations in which we are now, and are likely to be in the future, involved. The propose that a new type of training, much of it in the matter of attitudes as well as in specific skills, should be given serious consideration.
What you can do depends on what you can do with others Paddy Ashdown
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| 3 |
ID:
080868
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In light of present day calls for increased levels of cultural understanding on the part of Western forces engaged in conflict, this article assesses the utility of such knowledge in light of the British experience of the North-West Frontier of India 1901-1945. By using the British concept of the Political Officer as an example, it proposes that while cultural understanding is of genuine importance when operating in such a challenging environment, possession of it does not necessarily aid either the design or implementation of successful policy. As the British experience on the Frontier during this period illustrates, cultural awareness and understanding may be possessed in abundance, and the mechanisms for achieving such a state of understanding may be advanced, but traditional factors such as a cultural bias on the part of policy-makers, conservatism, underfunding, local resistance to unfamiliar concepts and a fractured civil-military relationship will dominate such awareness and overshadow the benefits that it may provide.
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