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ID:
081346
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article addresses a key debate within the terrorism literature-the relative importance of madrassahs for training terrorists. It argues that the two contending positions-madrassahs are not important for recruitment of terrorists and madrassahs are breeding grounds for terror are both overstated. Using a dataset constructed from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members, the author finds that JI-linked radical madrassah exposure is strongly associated with terrorist activity and is associated with more important roles on terrorist operations in Indonesia. The article argues that traditional scholarly theories and public debates on the importance of madrassahs are misguided because they only address top-down ideological indoctrination. The author's theory is that radical madrassahs provide a staging ground for both top-down recruitment and the creation of focal points that lead to tight knit social networks that radicalize members. In effect, they provide a "ready-made social network" for males, "give religious and ideological focus" to these groups, and provide a "particular action-oriented focus
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| 2 |
ID:
080882
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article highlights initial findings from the authors' Global Transnational Terrorism (GTT) Project, which began in August 2006. The case study draws on the database work for Southeast Asia and charts the rise of a militant minority within Jemaah Islamiyah, which was directly responsible for a series of attacks from 2000-2005. The important but restricted role of radical madrassahs and the importance of kinship emerge clearly from the study. On a more theoretical plane, the article shows how leadership "niches" opened up by unplanned events create contingent opportunities that lead to new developments.
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| 3 |
ID:
082923
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article offers a novel contribution to the terrorism literature by using mathematical modeling and case studies to demonstrate how terrorist and extremist groups can utilize social service provision activities and anti-corruption campaigns instead of violent activities to gain support.The basic argument of the model is that terrorist groups will try to gain support by promising that they will be better distributors of resources than the current regime once they gain power and by promising that they will be less corrupt. However, because all organizations can freely make these promises, their words are cheap talk, and the general population should ignore them. To overcome this problem, organizations must offer a costly signal. Provision of social goods and implementation of explicit anti-corruption campaigns before taking power serves as such a signal. As the United States government and its allies widen their "war on terrorism," they must consider the ramifications of social service provision and anti-corruption activities, which are common, effective, and potentially useful for increasing the probability of group success.
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