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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
080898
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the issues related to the admission of mainland Chinese capital and enterprises into Taiwan triggered off by Taiwan's membership in the World Trade Organization, including the coordination of political views, the adjustments in policies, the revisions of statutes, and the setting up of administrative monitoring mechanisms in Taiwan. The issue of entry represents the interaction of economic and security interests on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and it reflects the Chinese leadership's united front offensive, the competition among the political parties in Taiwan, and the business community's articulation of its interests in the island. The analysis aims to illustrate legislative and other processes involved in the economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait. These processes allow various parties concerned to set up obstacles that obstruct the desired economic exchanges. At the same time, the mutual economic interests, or at least the substantial economic interests on one side of the Taiwan Strait, constantly provide the momentum to overcome the obstacles. More importantly, the sophisticated business community can always find ways to overcome the obstacles in pursuit of their interests, for example, use of subsidiaries in tax havens.
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| 2 |
ID:
102642
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New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 2009.
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| Description |
15p.
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| Series |
Parliamentary procedure abstract series; 36
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:1,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 055719 | 328.404/IND 055719 | Main | On Shelf | Reference books | |
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| 3 |
ID:
127827
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Do big cities exert more power than less populous ones in American state legislatures? In many political systems, greater representation leads to more policy gains, yet for most of the nation's history, urban advocates have argued that big cities face systematic discrimination in statehouses. Drawing on a new historical dataset spanning 120 years and 13 states, we find clear evidence that there is no strength in numbers for big-city delegations in state legislatures. District bills affecting large metropolises fail at much higher rates than bills affecting small cities, counties, and villages. Big cities lose so often because size leads to damaging divisions. We demonstrate that the cities with the largest delegations-which are more likely to be internally divided-are the most frustrated in the legislative process. Demographic differences also matter, with district bills for cities that have many foreign-born residents, compared with the state as a whole, failing at especially high rates.
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