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ID:
080905
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Unsettled conditions on Jolo and Basilan islands in the southwestern Philippines have seriously hampered efforts to obtain information about the Abu Sayyaf. The result has been a continuing ignorance over the most fundamental features of the group. In the attempt to broaden our understanding of its structure, this article examines data drawn from an array of sources in light of the authoritative work of Thomas Kiefer on the traditional Tausug alliance system on Jolo. It argues that the Abu Sayyaf consists of a system of alliance groups of the kind customarily found in Muslim Filipino societies
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| 2 |
ID:
082676
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's status-quo-oriented post-Cold-War grand strategy of promoting cooperative security and multipolarity on the basis of the UN system is not applied in Northeast Asia. China's definition of its interests in Northeast Asia runs up against those promoted by the US alliance system, and no common political framework exists to encourage Beijing and Washington to adopt definitions that correspond to global rules of proper state conduct. Scholars and policymakers often base their analyses of Northeast Asian strategic uncertainty on the assumption that China applies its grand strategy in Northeast Asia as elsewhere, but that the regional context makes successful implementation difficult. This article instead argues that China has persuaded the international community that Northeast Asia is a region where special rules apply, justifying that Chinese policies towards Taiwan, Japan and the Korean peninsula are exempt from the principles of state conduct underpinning China's global grand strategy.
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| 3 |
ID:
181687
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| Summary/Abstract |
As China has emerged over the past decade as a peer competitor of the United States, the bilateral relationship has become confrontational. Given the relatively wide range of possible strategic outcomes, Europe’s primary task is to organise itself for uncertainty. It must also assume that the US will react negatively if Europe is seen as running counter to America’s policy in the Indo-Pacific and build resilience into its policies to deal with sudden shifts in US policy. Europe’s overarching aims should be defending itself against a revisionist Russia, insulating Europe against direct Chinese coercion, helping like-minded countries prevent China from overwhelming the rules-based international order and avoiding a major war between nuclear powers. Despite the acrimony in the China–US relationship, the fear of nuclear annihilation that helped keep the Cold War cold is notably absent. Trust, especially among allies, is therefore paramount.
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