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NEMETH, STEPHEN C (3) answer(s).
 
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ID:   172184


Generosity is a dangerous game: aid allocation and the risks of terrorism / Nemeth, Stephen C; Mauslein, Jacob A   Journal Article
Nemeth, Stephen C Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract While evidence has suggested that international assistance projects become the targets of violence, political science research has often addressed this relationship at the state level and not the aid location itself. Given the heterogeneous nature of aid distribution and terrorist behavior within a state, it is important to study this relationship using higher resolution data. Using geocoded terrorist attack and multilateral aid distribution data, coupled with the PRIO-GRID cell structure, our approach sheds light on whether areas in which aid is distributed are more likely to be targeted by terrorist groups. Our results show that areas where aid is being distributed are targeted more heavily than areas without aid distribution. The modality of specific multilateral aid projects is also shown to impact whether they are more likely to be targeted. Further, we show that terrorists select different types of targets in aid locations than they do in non-aid locations, lending support to the notion that terrorists seek to intimidate local populations from collaboration with the government and to dissuade further government efforts. The results not only highlight and expand upon the dangers associated with aid distribution, but also the notion that aid content is a factor in terrorist targeting preferences.
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2
ID:   165320


Geography and the Certainty of Terrorism Event Coding / Nemeth, Stephen C ; Mauslein, Jacob A   Journal Article
Nemeth, Stephen C Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract While event data provides researchers with insight into contemporary security threats, many are built upon secondary sources that may insert bias into empirical studies. Specifically, we argue that one form of bias—description bias—can be conditional on an event's characteristics or locale, thus influencing the certainty an observation is coded as an act of terrorism. We find that, using the Global Terrorism Database's own variables, attacks on civilians, particular types of tactics, and attacks that occur closer to a populated place are more likely to be coded as terrorism. These findings speak to broader conceptual issues in terrorism research and reiterate the need for researchers to evaluate the validity of their data before making claims.
Key Words Terrorism  Geography  Reporting Bias  Description Bias 
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3
ID:   080980


IO mediation of interstate conflicts: moving beyond the global versus regional dichotomy / Hansen, Holley E; Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin; Nemeth, Stephen C   Journal Article
Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin Journal Article
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Publication 2008.
Summary/Abstract Regional and global intergovernmental organizations have grown both in number and scope, yet their role and effectiveness as conflict managers is not fully understood. Previous research efforts tend to categorize organizations solely by the scope of their membership, which obscures important sources of variation in institutional design at both the regional and global levels. International organizations will be more successful conflict managers if they are highly institutionalized, if they have members with homogeneous preferences, and if they have more established democratic members. These hypotheses are evaluated with data on territorial (1816-2001), maritime (1900-2001), and river (1900-2001) claims from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and the Middle East. Empirical analysis suggests that international organizations are more likely to help disputing parties reach an agreement if they have more democratic members, if they are highly institutionalized, and when they use binding management techniques
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