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ID: 147906

Invest, hold up, or accept? China in multilateral governance / Kastner, Scott L; Pearson, Margaret M; Rector, Chad

Pearson, Margaret M	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

China has played an inconsistent role in multilateral governance, sometimes contributing to the creation and maintenance of international regimes, sometimes free riding or even threatening to undermine multilateral regimes to improve its position. We show that the strategic context of a particular issue of international concern affects China's approach to multilateralism and argue that our approach adds additional leverage to existing theories that rely on assumptions about its inherent disposition or socialization processes. An emerging global power will be willing to invest more in supporting a regime when its outside options are relatively poor. When its outside options are good, it will free ride on the efforts of more established states if it is not a necessary player in maintaining regimes, and if it is seen as indispensable it will threaten to hold up regime support as a way to win concessions. We show that these two factors, outside options and indispensability, can help explain changes in China's strategy with respect to the issue of North Korea's nuclear program and the regulation of international finance.

Key Words

China ; Multilateral Governance ; Invest ; Accept

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ID: 081248

National unification and mistrust: bargaining power and the prospects for a PRC/Taiwan agreement / Kastner, Scott L; Rector, Chad

Kastner, Scott L	Journal Article
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2008.

Summary/Abstract

Can states that mistrust each other as much as the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan reach unification agreements? Unification agreements are most feasible when one of two conditions holds: the unification bargain does not independently erode the bargaining power of the weaker state, or the more powerful state can commit credibly not to use its increased bargaining power to restructure the agreement ex post. Our argument accounts for two historical cases-the nineteenth century Argentine and German unifications-and helps to explain why the PRC has found it difficult to make progress on achieving a peaceful bargain with Taiwan. We describe several possible future scenarios for cross-Strait relations and show that democratization in the PRC is not a necessary prerequisite for a unification agreement between the mainland and Taiwan

Key Words

Taiwan ; China ; Cross-Strait Relations ; Unification Agreement ; Iran - Democracy - 1941-1953

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