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ID:
081251
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article uses the case of King Saul, David, and the Philistines, drawn from the Hebrew Bible (books 1 and 2 Samuel), to argue that leaders of states with contested or immature authority structures often elect to prioritize threats to their personal rule over external threats to the integrity and welfare of the states which they lead in a manner not predicted by neo-Realist international relations theory. In making this argument, this article not only makes a contribution to the Realist literature on threat prioritization but introduces a new, novel, and ancient data set which can be used both to generate new theories and to test existing theories within international relations.
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| 2 |
ID:
092390
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that Israel experiences a unique perception of the perils of anarchy that drives it to a strategic preference for disproportionately offensive action against rivals and enemies. Actions taken pursuant to that doctrine have caused serious inconvenience to U.S. foreign policy in the Mideast for over four decades. This article argues that by reassuring Israel, both diplomatically and with arms sales, that the United States is committed to its survival, the United States has obtained significant measures of strategic restraint on Israel's part. That restraint has brought significant benefit to the United States as it seeks to guarantee regular access to the vital resources of the Middle East. This article provides examples of both successful reassurance and reassurance denied to illustrate the argument that U.S. support produces tangible strategic benefits for the United States
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| 3 |
ID:
107613
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The argument that multipolar international systems are less stable because certain states have an incentive to externalize the costs of defense to other states has been built on interpretations of the behavior of France, Russia, and especially Great Britain between the two World Wars. This article addresses flaws in both the use of the French and Russian cases, but is most tightly focused on the British case, which was the strongest, prima facie, of the three. This article demonstrates how the British scheme for defense against Germany was not a policy of attempted externalization on either the political or military level. Consequently, the long debate over the relationship between systemic structure and systemic stability, which has been heavily influenced by the belief in the existence of an incentive to externalize defense costs under multipolarity, must be re-examined, with new tests run and new conclusions explored.
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