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| 1 |
ID:
119062
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The nonproliferation of weapons agenda was entirely about chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons because they were seen as the most threatening to human existence and the security of the most powerful countries. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), which have been instrumental to massive destruction of life and property, began to receive a serious attention from world leaders in the 1990s. Consequently, this article is concerned with the problems of controlling the proliferation of SALW in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. It argues that supply implicitly obeys the demand for SALW because it lacks a control factor. The presence of such a factor makes the acquisition of nuclear capability very difficult. Therefore, the effective control of SALW's proliferation would depend not only on controlling local demand factors but also on the presence of a supply control factor.
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| 2 |
ID:
131272
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| 3 |
ID:
098524
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| 4 |
ID:
169362
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In 2016, the spiritual base of Boko Haram, known as ‘Camp Zero’ was captured. With such success, most had thought that the chicken has finally come home to roost. Unfortunately, it was not to be. Because aside from Boko Haram, the country seems to experience other vagaries of insecurity. This range from kidnapping, cult and ritual groups in the south—such as female pant hunters, Badoo—oil bunkering and pipeline vandalism, cattle rustling and herdsmen–farmers crises, among others. Against this backdrop, this study is an attempt to trace the history of the terror group and examine the numerous insecurity challenges across the country despite international collaborations. The study revealed among other things that the perpetuation of terror and insecurity in the land is a reflection of the nature of the state itself—a failing, weak state. The study recommends that until there is a solution to the nature of the state itself, the insecurity will continue. Some of the solutions suggested are entrenchment of good leadership, political will, rule of law, good governance, eradication of poverty and illiteracy, and inclusive policies, among others.
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| 5 |
ID:
126879
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Instead of challenging the militants religious credentials, the government appears to be capitulating to them.
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| 6 |
ID:
191056
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Recognizing that militant, non-state groups utilize social media and online platforms to reach members, sympathizers, and potential recruits, state agencies and social media corporations now increasingly regulate access to accounts affiliated with such groups. Scholars examining deplatforming efforts have, to date, focused on the extent of audience loss after account restrictions and the identification of strategies for regrouping online followers on the same or different platforms over time. Left unexplored is if and how militant non-state groups adapt their official messaging strategies in response to platform restrictions despite continuing online access to them. To begin to fill that gap, this study compares ISIS’s 550 images displayed in the group’s official newsletter al-Naba six months before and after Europol’s November 2019 take-down of terrorist affiliated accounts, groups, channels, and bots on Telegram. It conducts a content analysis of images related to militaries and their outcomes, non-military activities and their outcomes, and presentational forms. The findings demonstrate that ISIS visually emphasizes its standard priming approach but shifts its agenda-setting strategy. While retaining some of its standard visual framing practices, the group also alters frames, particularly those related to images showing opposing militaries and military outcome.
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| 7 |
ID:
103764
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| 8 |
ID:
124711
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The holy month of Muharram is a dangerous time in Pakistan. It marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar but is also a period of mourning for Shiite Muslims. Each year, in the overflowing metropolis of Karachi, they take to the streets in processions by the thousands to observe Ashura, the anniversary of the martyrdom of Hussein ibn Ali, the Prophet Mohammed's grandson, and one of the holiest days of the year for Shiite Muslims. It is often a bloody affair, and not just because of the ritual self-flagellation in which many of the devout partake. Over the past four years, with astonishing punctuality, Shiite processions and mosques have been brutally attacked by Sunni supremacist militants bent on starting a sectarian war.
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| 9 |
ID:
158347
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| 10 |
ID:
102274
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| 11 |
ID:
086906
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| Publication |
2009.
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One by one, most places and institutions dear to Pakhtuns are coming under attack from the militants. Mosques and shrines have been bombed. The hujra, or the male guesthouse, has been frequently attacked while serving as a venue of public meetings and political gatherings. Jirgas in session have been targeted and scores of tribal elders and clerics in attendance have been killed. The lashkars, made up of armed tribal volunteers, too have faced the wrath of the suicide bomber.
It was said that Pakhtuns like good food and guns, and enjoy music and a nice joke. One will have to take out music from the list of things that Pakhtuns like because the Taliban militants don't like the playing of songs and musical instruments. However, they don't mind eating well, acquiring the most sophisticated weapons and cracking jokes in which someone else is ridiculed.
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| 12 |
ID:
160998
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Judging by recent media reporting and pronouncements by senior US military and security officials, the use of drones by militant groups is both reshaping conflict between armed non-state actors and state parties and now presents a grave and direct threat to nations in the West and elsewhere. But does this threat warrant the attention it is currently receiving? To answer this question, this article surveys how various militant groups have used drones both tactically on the battlefield and for wider strategic purposes. Closely examining how drones have been employed and by whom provides a basis for understanding variation in adoption. The article shows how drone usage or non-usage is highly contingent on the setting of the conflict, the aims of different groups, and the capacity of groups to adopt the technology. Though advances in drone technology could make the use-case more appealing for militant groups, drones will be subject to the same back-and-forth, techno-tactical adaptation dynamic between adversaries that have accompanied prior military innovations.
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| 13 |
ID:
111109
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| 14 |
ID:
134443
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Utilizing interviews with former Irish Republican Army (IRA) members, Loyalists, and community workers, the article looks at how militants in Northern Ireland have helped to prevent terrorism and political violence (TPV) by adopting roles in the community. By using mobile phones, a network of former combatants emerged around interface areas in the late 1990s to contain trigger causes of terrorism, providing a unique role that the state could not. The structure of the network encouraged militant groups to follow the IRA's example to disengage—thus creating a domino effect—and the co-operation between senior militants has limited the opportunities for other groups to mobilize a campaign of terrorism.
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| 15 |
ID:
123283
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The amnesty programme initiated by the Yar'Adua/Jonathan administration to placate militants in the oil-rich Niger Delta region, though reactive - like previous governments' strategies - has ensured relative peace in the region thereby bringing oil production to its maximum level thus far. But painfully this has not translated to a better life for the vast majority of those living in the Niger Delta who are not included in the amnesty programme. In this study, based on descriptive analysis, we aim to demonstrate: (i) the futility of the previous government's strong-arm measures in the management of the Niger Delta crisis and how this led inadvertently to the evolution and radicalization of militant groups that needed to be placated in order to curtail their heightened disruptive activities; and (ii) the amnesty programme adopted for this purpose is a short term expediency that could not address the myriad problems confronting the Niger Delta comprehensively. This implies that more broad-based programmes, targeted at the rapid development of the area, creation of job opportunities, environmental restoration and robust support for sustainable socio-economic endeavours geared towards self-reliance, would have to be proposed in order to ensure lasting peace in the region.
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| 16 |
ID:
129244
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| 17 |
ID:
095730
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| 18 |
ID:
099475
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| 19 |
ID:
099467
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| 20 |
ID:
129506
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