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| 1 |
ID:
104616
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| 2 |
ID:
118303
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article addresses why counterinsurgency is not, in fact, a strategy, and why the United States will nevertheless need to retain a counterinsurgency capability. It further examines the drivers of modern insurgency; the range of counterinsurgency approaches that have worked globally; and several case studies that illustrate how the United States might improve its counterinsurgency activity moving forward.
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| 3 |
ID:
168618
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| Summary/Abstract |
Outside some well-known movements like Al Qaeda, there is little understanding of how insurgent movements in the Global South gather, process and manage intelligence. This paper is based on fieldwork in Nepal with former members of the Maoist Army. The Maoists fought a secretive insurgency war for ten years, signing a peace agreement in 2006. Fieldwork involved former combatants, intelligence officers and Maoist cadres and analyses the intelligence methodology of the Maoist insurgency, placing this in to the context of Nepal Government operations. The Maoists benefited from poor opponents but they did establish an effective system of intelligence into operations.
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| 4 |
ID:
081511
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| 5 |
ID:
148047
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| Summary/Abstract |
Historically, insurgency is one of the most prevalent forms of armed conflict and it is likely to remain common in the foreseeable future. Recent experiences with counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan offer many lessons for future counterinsurgents, but the discourse on the subject continues to be mired in a traditional dichotomy pitting population-centric approaches to counterinsurgency against enemy-centric approaches. Historical analysis suggests that this traditional dichotomy is not a sufficiently nuanced way to understand or plan for such operations. Instead, discussions of counterinsurgency should focus on two dimensions: actions (use of physical force vs. political or moral actions) and targets (active insurgents vs. insurgent support). This perspective divides the space of possible counterinsurgency efforts into four quadrants, suggesting that effective counterinsurgency campaigns find a balance of effort across the four quadrants that is well matched to the specific context.
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| 6 |
ID:
157281
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| Summary/Abstract |
In early 2015, the Nigerian insurgent group Boko Haram appeared unstoppable. After gaining notoriety by kidnapping 276 schoolgirls in April 2014 in Chibok, Borno State, the group transformed from a troublesome terrorist group to a menacing insurgency. It declared allegiance to ISIS, seized command of territory close to the size of Rwanda, and began mounting attacks in neighboring states. With more than 10,000 killed on all sides of the conflict during the year, the insurgency could legitimately claim to be Africa's deadliest. In November of 2015, Boko Haram was declared the world's deadliest terror group by the Global Terrorism Index.
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