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ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   081525


Story of two administrative states: state capacity in Hong Kong and Singapore / Cheung, Anthony B L   Journal Article
Cheung, Anthony B L Journal Article
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Publication 2008.
Summary/Abstract Hong Kong and Singapore are both typical administrative states with an efficient administration and a vibrant market, which had achieved rapid economic growth in the past decades. This article examines the trajectory of their state capacity, highlighting recent problems and challenges. Based on a conceptual framework that captures and links up four dimensions - namely polity, bureaucracy, economy and civil society - their commonalities and differences in response are discussed. Their experience should be of particular relevance to transitional authoritarian states in Asia such as China, which faces similar challenges to reform in the arenas of politics, administration, economics and society.
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2
ID:   162216


Who Polices the Administrative State? / Lowande, Kenneth   Journal Article
LOWANDE, KENNETH Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Scholarship on oversight of the bureaucracy typically conceives of legislatures as unitary actors. But most oversight is conducted by individual legislators who contact agencies directly. I acquire the correspondence logs of 16 bureaucratic agencies and re-evaluate the conventional proposition that ideological disagreement drives oversight. I identify the effect of this disagreement by exploiting the transition from George Bush to Barack Obama, which shifted the ideological orientation of agencies through turnover in agency personnel. Contrary to existing research, I find ideological conflict has a negligible effect on oversight, whereas committee roles and narrow district interests are primary drivers. The findings may indicate that absent incentives induced by public auditing, legislator behavior is driven by policy valence concerns rather than ideology. The results further suggest collective action in Congress may pose greater obstacles to bureaucratic oversight than previously thought.
Key Words Administrative State 
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