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| 1 |
ID:
146904
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| Summary/Abstract |
People who rely on new information technologies to orchestrate protests face a common-knowledge constraint: the information on a proposed protest they release to potential participants can also be known by the government. This article examines the conditions under which protests mobilized through new information technologies become possible in China.
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| 2 |
ID:
081558
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Domestic economic institutions change through processes of conflict and bargaining. Why do the strongest groups in such conflicts ever change their minds about the acceptability of institutional arrangements they once opposed? Drawing on the cases of Ireland in 1986-87 and Italy in 1989-93, this article demonstrates how the process of common knowledge creation between employers and unions changed the course of negotiations over national wage bargaining institutions. Common knowledge creation happens when existing institutions are in crisis. The institutional experimentation that follows such crises, characterized by deep uncertainty, places a premium on persuasive argument. The ideas most likely to serve as the basis for newly common knowledge will have analytical and distributive appeal to both unions and employers, and they must be ratified in public agreements, which I call common knowledge events. Common knowledge events establish new social facts, which can change the payoffs associated with different institutional outcomes. This can lead even powerful actors to accept institutions they had previously opposed.
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| 3 |
ID:
154924
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| Summary/Abstract |
Starting with the Stimson Doctrine in the early 1930s, the international community has adopted, on numerous occasions, a policy of nonrecognition in response to international boundary changes gained through the use of force. Why? This article uses an investigation of the Manchurian Crisis to reconceptualize nonrecognition as a symbolic sanction against a norm violation. Existing accounts often view symbolic sanctions like nonrecognition as either failed attempts at coercion or mere posturing for domestic audiences. Against this view, this article explains how collective symbolic sanctions create or recreate common knowledge of what the rules of international behavior are in the face of a lack of effective rule enforcement. This common knowledge, or intersubjective understanding, shapes future expectations and interpretations. Nonrecognition of the spoils of war is thus a means to reinforce the norm of nonaggression within international society by reestablishing a shared valuation of the rule.
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