Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
047560
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Publication |
New Delhi, Department of Atomic Energy, 1998.
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Description |
277p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
043185 | 333.7924/SUN 043185 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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2 |
ID:
083634
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3 |
ID:
107761
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Publication |
Austria, International Atomic Energy Agency, 1960.
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Description |
Vol.3; 354p.
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Contents |
Vol-3: Research, Test and Experimental Reactors
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
016686 | 621.483205/INT 016686 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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4 |
ID:
136726
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Publication |
Kolkata, Rajiv Bahl, 2014.
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Description |
374p.Hbk
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Standard Number |
9789384333690
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
058104 | 333.7924/BAH 058104 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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5 |
ID:
018965
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Publication |
Spring 2001.
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Description |
86-101
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6 |
ID:
082429
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Publication |
2008.
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Summary/Abstract |
In 2007, 334 nuclear reactors (including for naval propulsion) and isotope production facilities employed highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel or target material. One year of operations at these reactors and facilities required more than 3,100 kilograms (kg) of HEU for naval propulsion, more than 750 kg for research reactors, and 40?-50 kg for isotope production in civilian facilities-in addition to several tons used in other types of reactors. Material with high enrichment levels and low radiation barriers stored or handled in large batches, such as HEU target waste and certain types of fuel from isotope production, research reactors/critical assemblies, and naval fuel, presents serious safety and security concerns. Forty-eight civilian research reactors have converted to low-enriched uranium as a result of a three-decade international effort to minimize HEU use, resulting in a decrease in HEU consumption of 278 kg per year. This article's establishment of baseline measurements for assessing the results of HEU minimization efforts calls for additional focus on the scope and methodology of HEU minimization. Facility decommissioning and dismantling should play a larger role in the future HEU minimization effort, materials with specific weapons-relevant properties should be given higher priority compared to bulk HEU material, and the use of large quantities of weapon-grade HEU fuel for naval propulsion should be reconsidered.
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7 |
ID:
082596
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8 |
ID:
114440
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
The first of the two 1,000 MW nuclear power plants under construction
for the last decade
1
at Kudankulam was due to become operational before
the end of this year. What it stares at instead is a delayed future after the
Tamil Nadu Cabinet passed a resolution in September 2011 to suspend
work on the nuclear reactor. Chief Minister Jayalalitha claimed to have
been compelled to do so in response to the public protests against the
nuclear plant, and she certainly had an eye on the local elections that
were due less than a month before the protests broke out.
2
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9 |
ID:
066986
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10 |
ID:
053525
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Publication |
Sep-Oct 2004.
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11 |
ID:
102331
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12 |
ID:
082426
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Publication |
2008.
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Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the production of metastable technetium-99 (Tc-99m), the world's most important radiopharmaceutical, focusing on reliability of supply and risks of nuclear terrorism. Only four producers manufactured about 95 percent of the world's Tc-99m; a closure of any of them could cause worldwide shortfalls. Moreover, all four employ highly enriched uranium in their production process, in a form relatively easy to convert into the metal needed for a nuclear bomb. The technology to employ low-enriched uranium (LEU)-not usable in weapons-to produce Tc-99m is proven, available, and has been used by smaller producers. However, political determination and sufficient funding are needed to convert the major producers' isotope production to LEU and encourage new LEU-based production. Such efforts are needed to ensure supplies and reduce security risks.
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13 |
ID:
122090
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14 |
ID:
022754
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Publication |
Oct 2002.
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Description |
33-39
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15 |
ID:
048544
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Edition |
4th ed.
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Publication |
New York, Chapman and Hall, 1994.
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Description |
2v(xiii, 852p.)
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Contents |
Vol 1: Reactor design basics
Vol 2: Reactor systems engineering
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Standard Number |
0412985314
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
040974 | 621.4831/GLA 040974 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
040975 | 621.4831/GLA 040975 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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16 |
ID:
082424
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Publication |
2008.
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Summary/Abstract |
An increasing number of countries recognize the special risks of nuclear terrorism associated with the civilian use and storage of and commerce in highly enriched uranium (HEU). They are especially concerned that non-state actors might gain access to HEU and use it to build and detonate improvised nuclear devices. The risk is aggravated by the very large global stocks of HEU, some of which are inadequately protected. Although HEU has few commercial uses, and most experts believe it is technically feasible to substitute low-enriched uranium for HEU in nearly all civilian applications, efforts to reduce HEU stocks have been impeded by a variety of economic, political, and strategic considerations. This article analyzes the nature of these impediments and discusses what is required to overcome them
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17 |
ID:
082430
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Publication |
2008.
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Summary/Abstract |
In the last three decades, the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactors program has made great progress in developing the technical means to eliminate HEU use in most civilian applications. Yet in practice, this has not translated into significant global reductions in HEU use. This article identifies steps to build the international consensus needed to reduce the risks posed by HEU. Immediate steps include devising new incentives for reactor shutdown and conversion; establishing research reactor coalitions; launching a global HEU database; giving the International Atomic Energy Agency a mandate to promote HEU minimization; and improving physical protection standards. Intermediate measures include the adoption of HEU management guidelines and a code of conduct. Further, national governments should pass laws phasing out domestic use of HEU and conditioning HEU exports on conversion commitments. In the long term, international legal measures must be adopted to eliminate the risks posed by HEU.
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18 |
ID:
020569
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Publication |
2001.
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Description |
33-79
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19 |
ID:
128919
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20 |
ID:
009225
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Publication |
Spring-Summer 1995.
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Description |
49-51
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