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| 1 |
ID:
107581
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The economic growth of Eastern states is leading to exceedingly consequential developments for their respective military and civilian space programs. The Chinese space program in particular is developing at a rapid pace, which is commensurate with China's economic growth. Accordingly, if the United States is to retain its quantitative and qualitative edges in space it must recover the dynamism with which to further its economic and technological development. In this regard, inflatable designs for space solar power (SSP) are emerging whose economic impact can power the development of American space capabilities in the twenty-first century. With these platforms the United States can rejoin the space race with immense resources.
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| 2 |
ID:
117038
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
2004 was the year when the Japanese public's affinity with China dropped dramatically, to 37.6 %, due to anti-Japan riots in China. Now more than 70 % of the Japanese public does not feel an affinity with China. How could such a strong anti-Chinese sentiment influence Japan's policy toward China? This paper considers this question by examining Japan's decision-making process on terminating the much-criticized yen loans to China. Yen loans are a type of Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by the Japanese government to countries lacking sufficient funds for economic development. China is one of the top yen loan borrowers, and the loans have contributed to China's economic growth and increasing openness. However, in March 2005, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura told Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing that Japan intended to phase out the yen loans before the 2008 Beijing Olympics and reached an agreement on the matter. Two-and-a-half years later, Japan terminated its yen loans to China, as the foreign ministers had agreed. Through mainly firsthand documents and interviews with government officials, this paper will clarify the following two points: (1) While it is true that the Japanese government significantly reduced its yen loan package to China from 2001 onward due to domestic criticism of China, as pointed out by previous studies, it was not planning to terminate the yen loans as of summer 2004. Instead, the Japanese government was contemplating how to keep providing yen loans to China; (2) Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, who was appointed in September 2004, had pushed for the termination of yen loans to China only after anti-Chinese sentiment rose dramatically in summer 2004, because he felt that continuing the much-criticized yen loans would not benefit stable Japan-China relations. This paper sheds light on the background of the termination of yen loans to China, a major milestone in postwar Japan-China relations that had been unclear until now. Having said this, the more important point of this paper may be that it also shows the influence of strong anti-Chinese sentiment on Japan's policies toward China.
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| 3 |
ID:
129395
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| 4 |
ID:
081748
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The impressive growth of the Chinese economy in the past three decades has attracted a lot of attention and hence the research interest of many scholars and policy makers. One of the focuses in the literature is the role of productivity in China's economic growth. This paper aims to revisit the debate about the role of productivity in China's growth, to provide an updated estimate of productivity growth and hence to make a contribution to the understanding of China's economic growth in recent years. Its objective is to propose and apply a growth accounting technique to assess economic performance in China, in particular the role of technological progress in China's recent growth. The findings about the latter may have important policy implications for the sustainability of China's economic growth in the future
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