| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
095121
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Following the adoption of a new constitution by national referendum, Myanmar's military junta is set to organize multiparty elections in 2010. Not least to influence Myanmar's leadership, with regard to the conditions Washington believes necessary for credible elections, the United States announced in September 2009 that it would embark on a new approach towards Naypyidaw. This will focus on a high-level dialogue while keeping existing sanctions in place. The Obama administration has asked the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to support this new approach. Against the backdrop of the deep divide between the ruling generals and Aung San Suu Kyi, and the continued conflict between Naypyidaw and armed ethnic nationalities, this article asks: How strong is ASEAN's record when it comes to influencing the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in relation to matters of national reconciliation and political transition? What factors explain ASEAN's approach towards Myanmar? What prospect, if any, is there that ASEAN states can influence Myanmar's political developments before the 2010 elections? The article argues that ASEAN has not moved beyond a collective criticism which aims to induce Naypyidaw to respond positively to the demands of its international detractors. ASEAN's norms, different political identities and geopolitical interests coupled with the SPDC's prickliness have limited the consensus on Myanmar. Naypyidaw's calculations about relations with Washington, rather than ASEAN's 'enhanced interactions' with the military government, and domestic political dynamics are likely to be the crucial determinants of further developments in the context of the 2010 elections.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
081829
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2008.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Myanmar's military regime drew global condemnation in September 2007 when it brutally suppressed anti-government demonstrations. Although this junction appeared to be a turning point since it facilitated greater international intervention, recent events indicate a return to "normalcy" as the regime ruled out dialogue with the main opposition party and proceeded with its own roadmap to political transition.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
086692
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Cyclone Nargis struck Burma's Irrawaddy Delta on May 2-3, 2008, and claimed as many as 140,000 victims, the largest natural disaster in the country's history. However, the State Peace and Development Council proceeded with a referendum on a new constitution on May 10 and 24, which it claimed was approved by an overwhelming majority of voters.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
099946
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Held in a virtual state of suspended animation for the past twenty years, US relations with Myanmar have received fresh scrutiny as the country undergoes a political transition from martial law to quasi-parliamentary governance. As a result, the Obama administration has fashioned a new policy of pragmatic engagement to balance US sanctions against Myanmars military regime, to reinvigorate Americas relations with ASEAN and to create a more flexible policy structure for fashioning US responses to a variety of possible outcomes in Myanmars transition process.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
114648
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Burma's recent election was clearly not free and fair. However, it can also be seen as
improving a uniquely unrepresentative government, creating greater pluralism, and
institutionalizing differences within the ruling junta. Even the rigged election may
have created opportunities for further opening in the future.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|