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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
122063
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The hallmarks of the Revisionist political platform, such as opposition to the project of the enlarged Jewish Agency or the idea of fundamental land and fiscal reform in Palestine aimed at an intensification of the settlement endeavour, began to appear spontaneously, particularly in Russo-Ukrainian Zionist circles, during the second quarter of 1922. The so-called 'Our Platform', a series of articles setting out the Revisionist proposals, published in March 1924, was a joint undertaking and the culmination of numerous, sometimes inconclusive, discussions. The creation of the Union of Zionists-Revisionists sealed this process in 1925. The aim of this article is to investigate the three-year prelude to the organized Revisionist movement, highlighting the role performed by activists, almost all of whom have been forgotten over time (J. Brutzkus, S. Gepstein, J. Schechtman and I. Trivus, among others). It identifies the opposition to the enlarged Jewish Agency project (and not the rejection of the White Paper of 1922) as the main galvanizing point of the process. Last, but not least, it argues that many of the political notions commonly attributed to Jabotinsky actually originated with others among the Revisionist founders.
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| 2 |
ID:
183490
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| Summary/Abstract |
French policy towards Israel in the 1950s and 1960s depended on a number of variables. Above all, French diplomacy never considered Israel apart from broader Middle Eastern and international considerations. The collusion of the Sinai Campaign of 1956 transformed this situation only to a certain extent; parallel evaluation of the merits and limits of Franco-Israeli relations predated the establishment of the French Fifth Republic. A process of readjustment undertaken by de Gaulle’s administration came to the fore in 1960. It combined elements of practical assistance with reserved association in public. The nature of transition defied simple classification. While Israel was concerned about allegedly waning support, the official French narrative denied the existence of a major shift in the substance of bilateral ties. In a way, each party misinterpreted the actions of the other: for Israel, ongoing French assistance did not fully outweigh the decline in overt expressions of ‘friendship’; viewed from Paris, the reactions to every minor French ‘no’ seemed exaggerated. The limitations accompanying bilateral trade confirmed these diverging perspectives even further. Yet, seen in its proper historical context, the outcome of this process was not set in stone.
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| 3 |
ID:
081999
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