|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
157655
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Within the framework of arguing with K. Asmolov's article, the author expresses his views on the current situation and variants of a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. Positions of the key participants in the conflict are analyzed from the point of view of security in Northeast Asia.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
147044
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The decades-long tug of war on the Korean Peninsula has entered a new and more dangerous round in recent years. North Korea and South Korea both have not recognized the results of the 1950-1953 war and have not made peace. In the 1970s-1980s, North Korea relied on Chinese and Soviet assistance in defending the country, dreaming even of using their assistance in achieving reunification on its own terms. There are no such hopes any more. While some hotheads in Pyongyang may be considering taking over the South using nuclear supremacy, the regime would hardly resort to that. Until recently, tensions on the Korean Peninsula increased and subsided with seasonal regularity. But no one dared to cross the red line as neither side is prepared to start a large war. In fact, there are no goals that could justify such a war.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
097348
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
101671
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
North Korea is today in the limelight of rivalry between the United States and China. The essence of the geopolitical game lies in the desire to liquidate the North Korean state, which would mean not only a revision of the results of World War II, but also the major success of the United States in preventing Chinese domination in Asia. Russia should decide which direction of the development of the Korean situation meets its national interests-unification of Korea on South Korean terms, a radical change of the military-political balance in the Far East, or the status quo, which means the preservation of North Korean statehood. The key to the Russian strategy on the Korean problem is, and will remain, the preservation of good relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Adhering to this position Russia is interested in stopping the development of missile-nuclear programs.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
082051
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
108568
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Despite constant fluctuations between tensions and detente on the Korean peninsula,
the crisis in 2010, including the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyong Island
shelling has proved to become the most dangerous in decades-without obvious
new reasons or new contradictions to justify it. After President Lee Myung Bak's
coming to power in South Korea, Pyongyang developed suspicions over his new
hard-line stance and demands for denuclearization. North Korea thought that
Seoul's call for reforms were merely a cover to undermine their regime and it
took seriously the desire by Southern conservatives for "early reunification" and
thus resorted to military provocations. Meanwhile, the U.S. Obama administration
chose to abstain from any meaningful policy toward North Korea, while China
played a more active role in supporting Pyongyang and Russian policy, which is
based on the priority of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. All issues
should be decided by political and diplomatic means without the use of force,
threats, pressure, or isolation. Improvements in North-South relations, DPRK
dialogue with the West, and a multilateral format are essential prerequisites for
realizing a new security system in Korea that takes into account the interests of all
parties. Only this can avert a new crisis. The author suggests a return to engagement
and the promotion of slow evolutionary changes in North Korea by giving the
current ruling elite tangible guarantees of security on the condition that the North
would change its domestic and international behavior.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
106822
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
151551
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The enthusiasm for the "pivot to the East," which emerged in Russia (somewhat unexpectedly even for the ideologists and advocates of this doctrine) after its stand-off with the West a few years ago, seems to be over. The reason may be the loss of illusions: not only some politicians but also businessmen and the public, doused by a cold shower of Western sanctions, at first hoped that they would easily find solace in a warm embrace of Eastern partners. Incidentally, in Russia's public perception "the East" includes almost the entire "non-West"—from the Atlantic coast of Morocco to the Japanese islands. Clearly, in this discourse "the East" simply does not exist in reality. But the persistence of the Soviet-era idea of "common destiny in the national liberation movement and anti-imperialist solidarity" fueled these expectations. Some people thought that Russia's "civilizational platform" was closer to the East than to the West, which would help the two parties find a common language, as before. In addition, some Eastern countries owed much to the Soviet Union which had helped them build a modern economic base; so it was believed that they should be more sensitive to Russia's needs. The very cliche of "Russia turning to the East" presupposed that Russia was the actor of this process, while the East was only the subject, interested in it in one way or another.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
138217
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
A veteran diplomat told me in a private conversation recently, when we were discussing Russia's foreign policy priorities, that the BRICS (an association of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) was nothing more than a "photo opportunity" for its leaders and politicians, a kind of window dressing aimed at demonstrating "the failure of attempts to isolate Russia internationally."
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|