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ID:
082084
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| 2 |
ID:
149818
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| Summary/Abstract |
concerns about government stability ahead of the 2018 presidential election are driving Vladimir Putin into reforms of Russia's security apparatus. Mark Galeotti surveys changes that could substantially reorient Moscos's internal security and espionage posture.
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| 3 |
ID:
071438
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| Publication |
Tokyo, International house of Japan, 2006.
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| Description |
xxxiv, 332p.hbk
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| Series |
LTCB International Library Trust
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| Standard Number |
4924971197
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 051209 | 952.03/HIR 051209 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
191084
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| Summary/Abstract |
The early history of the postwar West German foreign intelligence service is replete with accounts of former Nazi security officers who were recruited by the newly founded service thanks to their professional experience, connections, and anti-Soviet credentials, only to later be exposed as Soviet moles. Focusing on the case of Heinz Felfe, this article puts forward the argument that the reaction of a secret service to the impending exposure of moles can be even more harmful than their actual activity. Enemy moles in intelligence organizations are dangerous in more than one way. They cause damage, of course, when they operate in the dark, but also cause just as much, and even more, damage when exposed. The fear of public scandal incentivizes irrational behavior, aggravating rather than decreasing the dangers facing the service.
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| 5 |
ID:
107118
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
GENERATIONS OF SOVIET PEOPLE and citizens of the Russian Federation have been asking the same question: Was the Soviet Union ready to rebuff Hitler's aggression on June 22, 1941? If the country was completely ready why the crushing defeats and appalling casualties of the first months of the war? If it was not prepared then who is to blame?
In many respects (the number and efficiency of heavy tanks) the Red Army was much superior to the Wehrmacht which had no heavy tanks at the early stages of war in the East.
Why then the humiliation of the early months?
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