Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
113216
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
This article consists of selected translations from captured interviews and dairies of Al Qaida members. The time period covered is from mid-2001 to early 2002 and concerns their operations in Afghanistan. The material clearly conveys a range of emotion, from confident to despondent, as well as efforts to contest the US actions. The first several pages give the reader context and some possible "lessons learned," but the story(ies) are best told by the Al Qaida members themselves. All names are pseudonyms.
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2 |
ID:
124415
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
Canada's first fighting season in Kandahar was traumatic. More than 40 soldiers were killed and several hundred injured. The unexpected strength of the insurgents' offensive was, in the Canadian experience, made worse by the extremely disappointing performance of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. Improving the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces soon became an urgent concern and possible exit strategy. Part of Canada's answer was the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT), which consisted of small groups of soldiers working side by side with Afghan forces to build their capability. This paper, based on interviews with former OMLT mentors, examines the origins and expansion of the Canadian OMLT, and offers an initial assessment of its impact.
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3 |
ID:
102859
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4 |
ID:
096986
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5 |
ID:
093769
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6 |
ID:
095602
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7 |
ID:
092186
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
The fragile political system has formed a nexus with political, sectarian, regional and ethnic fissures in Afghanistan.As long as there was a modicum of political order, ethnic and other related issues remained underground and did not cause much trouble although the deprivations of ethnic minorities kept simmering.
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8 |
ID:
101915
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
Al Qaeda is stronger today than when it carried out the 9/11 attacks. Accounts that contend that it is on the decline treat the central al Qaeda organization separately from its subsidiaries and overlook its success in expanding its power and influence through them.
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9 |
ID:
114978
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
Over the last two decades, there has been a 'democratic turn' in peace and conflict research, that is, the peculiar impact of democratic politics on a wide range of security issues has attracted more and more attention. Many of these studies are inspired by Immanuel Kant's famous essay on 'Perpetual Peace'. In this article, we present a critical discussion of the 'democratic distinctiveness programme' that emerged from the Democratic Peace debate and soon spread to cover a wider range of foreign policy issues. The bulk of this research has to date been based on an overly optimistic reading of a 'Kantian peace'. In particular, the manifold forms of violence that democracies have exerted, have been treated either as a challenge to the Democratic Peace proposition or as an undemocratic contaminant and pre-democratic relict. In contrast, we argue that forms of 'democratic violence' should no longer be kept at arm's length from the democratic distinctiveness programme but instead should be elevated to a main field of study. While we acknowledge the benefits of this expanding research programme, we also address a number of normative pitfalls implied in this scholarship such as lending legitimacy to highly questionable foreign policy practices by Western democracies. We conclude with suggestions for a more self-reflexive and 'critical' research agenda of a 'democratically turned' peace and conflict studies, inspired by the Frankfurt school tradition.
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10 |
ID:
168051
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Summary/Abstract |
The hostage release operations at Entebbe, Uganda in 1976 and Kandahar, Afghanistan in 1999 are studies in contrast in terms of the classic phases of hostage crises and responses of state actors. S Krishnan explores the crucial aspects of the two crises and looks for object lessons from the Israeli and Indian experiences, which evince deep differences in philosophy and capability between the two states.
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11 |
ID:
157752
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Publication |
DelhI, Shipra Publications, 2017.
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Description |
x, 181p.hbk
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Standard Number |
9789386262462
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
059325 | 302.230954/SIN 059325 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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12 |
ID:
113610
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13 |
ID:
130257
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14 |
ID:
144332
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Summary/Abstract |
The US Army has two approaches to counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. One is hard, or combat-focused, and the other is soft, or development-focused. This study examines two US Army task forces deployed to Panjwai District, Afghanistan from 2012 to 2013. CTF 4-9 and 1-38 offer a meaningful comparison because they pursued these contrasting approaches among the same population and against the same enemy at the same time and place. The study compares each unit’s approach and finds that neither approach was successful absent the other. The article concludes by recommending further research into combining the approaches at the operational level.
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15 |
ID:
100569
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
There are no easy or cost-free ways to escape the current quagmire in Afghanistan. Although it has problems, a de facto partition of Afghanistan, in which Washington pursues nation building in the north and counterterrorism in the south, offers an acceptable fallback.
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16 |
ID:
100644
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Publication |
2010.
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Summary/Abstract |
Based on close observation of Regional Command (South) personnel in and around Kandahar, Anthony King offers an early assessment of Hamkari, a counter-insurgency approach that prioritises the political. But does the West really understand the complexities of the tribal fabric of patronage that underpins Afghan society? ISAF must find a way to engage with the power-brokers, or risk ploughing resources and lives into an impossible vision of a centralised state.
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17 |
ID:
091471
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
The only two Westerners living on their own in Kandar have been bombed, ambushed, and nearly sold to kidnappers.Here's what they've learned about the country where war just won't end.
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18 |
ID:
127748
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19 |
ID:
113153
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20 |
ID:
121234
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
As the fullest mobilization of Canadian men and materiel since the Korean
War, and also the costliest in blood and treasure, the 2005 deployment of the
Canadian Forces (CF) to Kandahar would deserve scholars' attention even
if it had gone according to plan. That it instead developed into something
neither the government nor the public had anticipated only enhances
the challenge-and value-of understanding it. Fuelled by the mission's
controversial nature, a sizeable literature soon developed to explain the
government's actions. The international system, institutional imperatives,
and even specific individuals have all been identified as key shapers of policy.
Diverse though it is in some respects, however, the literature is in others
strikingly homogeneous, particularly as concerns its geography: most of the
studies of Canada's third Afghan deployment have been carried out in North
America, and usually Canada.
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