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ID:
081904
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 1975, lawmakers have displayed four responses to the call for greater intelligence accountability on Capitol Hill. Some have taken the approach of 'ostriches', content to bury their heads in the sand and continue the earlier era of trust when members of Congress deferred to the decisions of the executive branch within the domains of intelligence. Others - indeed, a majority - have chosen to become unalloyed boosters for intelligence -' cheerleaders' who view their job primarily as one of explaining the value of intelligence to the American people and supporting intelligence missions with robust funding and encouragement. Taking the opposite approach, another set of lawmakers - the 'lemon-suckers' - have consistently found fault with America's attempts to spy on adversaries or overthrow regimes that fail to accommodate US interests. Finally, some lawmakers have been 'guardians', striking a balance between serving as partners of the intelligence agencies on Capitol Hill and, through a persistent examination of budgets and operations, demanding competence and law-abiding behavior from these agencies. The guardian model fits best into the framework of democratic theory.
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| 2 |
ID:
081905
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In March 2007, following arbitration between Israel's director of Military Intelligence in the Yom Kippur War, Maj. Gen. Eli Zeira and the Mossad chief in 1973, Zvi Zamir, it was officially ruled out that Zeira leaked the identity of Israel's most important source in Egypt to unauthorized journalists. The agent, Dr Ashraf Marwan, Nasser's son-in-law and Sadat's close advisor, had since 1969 given the Mossad excellent information about Egypt's war preparations. He was also the source for the warning that ultimately geared Israel to war a few hours before it started on 6 October 1973. This article describes the process through which, from the early 1990s, Zeira leaked to unauthorized students of the Yom Kippur War information concerning the identity of the source and hypothesizes about what could have motivated him to take this action
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| 3 |
ID:
081902
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The pursuit of intelligence on the German economy by the United States Army Air Corps prior to 1942 revealed great gaps in US knowledge of the German economy. This encouraged joint efforts with British Intelligence. The Air Corps exploited sources creatively to find German industrial targets. Its specialized needs persuaded it to try to establish an Air Corps intelligence gathering section. The Air Corps clashed with the Army over access to economic data. Its need for economic intelligence merged with its political goal of making strategic bombing its primary mission. Intelligence gathering efforts ultimately translated into the creation of air warfare strategy
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| 4 |
ID:
081901
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The use of probability propositions is widespread in Intelligence estimation and strategic forecasts, as in everyday life. This paper attempts to give clear meaning to the use of probability statements for future strategic assessment. The first half presents possible interpretations in the philosophy of probability, while the second part applies the understandings of the first half to the Intelligence estimation process. A recommendation for a combination of 'a priori' interpretation of probability with a higher level of 'relative frequency' interpretation is the result of this paper
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| 5 |
ID:
081903
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States is more than six years into its global war on terrorism, relying ever more on expanded wiretapping powers to halt its spread. However, looking at Germany, a country which has made far more extensive use of wiretaps for a far longer period of time, suggests that reliance on wiretaps, while not entirely ineffectual, might be more of a panacea to make people feel they are being protected than a fully functional tool in breaking up terror plots. Should the United States keep investing in these programs, or should it consider other weapons against terror?
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