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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
082136
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Washington's growing reliance upon international private security companies (PSCs) will lead to these firms becoming prominent vehicles in the prosecution of the counterinsurgency in Iraq. This shift, however, risks labeling PSCs as mercenaries and presents considerable challenges regarding the control of non-state violence. Moreover, tradeoffs exist regarding the different nationalities of PSC personnel. Utilization of personnel from the developed world risks compromising the capabilities of Special Operations Forces. Additionally, shifts in casualty recognition amongst US policymakers and the media suggest that the private option is becoming politically salient and thus less useful. Many developing world states are increasingly concerned about how the global outsourcing of security sector expertise risks their stability and ability to execute coherent policy. Finally, the employment of Iraqis in PSCs sends mixed messages to the Iraqi populace about the need for and the effectiveness of a cohesive and responsible indigenous security sector.
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| 2 |
ID:
082139
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the 'political' and 'military' strategies used by the Indian state successfully to quell the Sikh insurgency in Punjab, and applies these lessons to controlling the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. At a conceptual level, this article argues that insurgencies are both a 'military' and 'political' phenomenon, and that ways to quell them can be either 'military' or 'political,' or a combination thereof. At the empirical level, this article argues that stability cannot be restored to Iraq until Sunni political actors are effectively brought into the mainstream political process through either 'military' or 'political' means, or a combination thereof. The analysis in this article provides substantive depth and detail to these otherwise seemingly straightforward propositions.
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| 3 |
ID:
082141
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper argues on the basis of a series of historical examples that include the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaya and Northern Ireland, that there is no perfect counterinsurgency model and that each counterinsurgency campaign is different. Counterinsurgents need to have a series of basic tenets to wage successful war against guerrillas and insurgents. These include: a clear political policy from the government under insurgent attack, a strategy to keep the population safe, successful intelligence gathering, a recognition that successful counterinsurgency is manpower intensive and a high priority on the destruction of the insurgent infrastructure. This paper urges that in period of peacetime it is essential that militaries develop a Standing Counterinsurgency Concepts Unit that can conceptualise past and present insurgent patterns and build this into military and strategic planning.
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| 4 |
ID:
082140
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| 5 |
ID:
082138
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article sets out to investigate the impact of Private Security Companies (PSCs)1 on civil wars. In doing so, it has taken an historical line, outlining the way the industry has developed from when it first emerged on the international stage in the late 1960s, to the present. Importantly, the article is able to identify three broad strands of involvement in civil wars that include substituting for state military forces, propping up weak governments, and supplementing state militaries. Moreover, in each of these situations, the involvement of PSCs raises both moral and legal questions, as well as challenges for government. This is especially so in light of their activities in Iraq and Afghanistan and the likelihood that governments will increasingly turn to them for niche capabilities.
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| 6 |
ID:
082142
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the motivations that push individuals to join and remain in insurgent groups. Though I consider the Colombian guerrillas, these findings are not necessarily case-specific. I argue that socio-psychological motivations at the individual level may be the most significant reason for joining, surpassing in importance grievance-based, ideological and even economic motivations. Moreover, I find that the lack of cohesion inside the Colombian guerrillas may boost economic motivations, further weakening insurgents' commitment to the pursuit of political power, and to the improvement of the socio-political position of those they claim to represent. This type of research contributes to a greater understanding of those in armed groups and it provides insights for developing focused recruitment prevention programs. It also contributes to the growing literature that explores the meaning and character of insurgencies, and possibly terrorist organizations
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| 7 |
ID:
082137
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay argues that the United States is engaged in the first post-modern conflict, a form of warfare for which it is not ready. It advances the argument that the nature of war has changed because the sociology of war has changed, but, the United States readies itself to fight those wars it understands and knows how to fight. The problem is that the nature of warfare is changing, has changed and that much of US policy, strategy, and the institutions that develop and implement them have not understood or adjusted to the changing nature of war. We have moved from the era of modern war into the era of post-modern war, into an age of war without a center of gravity
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