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| 1 |
ID:
082407
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Reputations are supposed to matter. Decision makers consistently refer to reputations for resolve, and international relations theories confirm the value of being able to credibly signal intentions during times of crisis. However, empirical support for the effects of reputation has been lacking. Problems of strategic selection have hampered previous quantitative tests, and the qualitative literature provides scant support for the concept in individual crises. In this article, the author shifts the focus from crisis behavior to alliance commitments and examines the effects that opportunities to uphold previous commitments have on future alliance commitments and conflicts. The results demonstrate that alliance reputations do affect both alliance formation and dispute behavior
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| 2 |
ID:
152377
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| Summary/Abstract |
An institutional perspective on nuclear deterrence cooperation within alliances has the potential to fundamentally reorient how we think about analyzing nuclear and deterrence decision-making between nuclear patrons and non-nuclear clients. It comes at a time when the presidency of Donald Trump is sure to test many of the core claims and assumptions in security studies, especially relating to bargaining and credibility within alliances. This article surveys questions that will be core to the research agenda involving alliance institutions and nuclear weapons during the Trump presidency and beyond.
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| 3 |
ID:
142974
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| Summary/Abstract |
The notion that credibility is important in international politics, and maintaining it requires following through on threats and commitments to establish a reputation for resolve, has been standard diplomatic savoir-faire for decades, with its most influential articulation in the work of Thomas Schelling. According to a new consensus it also is wrong; credibility is linked exclusively to the relative capabilities and interests a state can bring to bear. The new consensus was invoked to criticize the Obama administration's coercive strategy against Syrian chemical weapons use in 2013. This article revisits Schelling to determine whether critics have an accurate depiction of coercive diplomacy theory. The analysis show that many of Schelling's specific arguments related to American–Soviet Cold War rivalry were mistakenly offered as general statements about reputation in all coercive bargaining encounters. A more nuanced interpretation stresses commitment of reputation operating within the complexity of the particular bargaining situation. Reputations are relevant but do not determine credibility in international politics; they matter more, relative to other factors, in iterated encounters (and the expectation of future crises) between the same two actors, a situation that approximates Schelling's ‘continuous negotiation’, as well as across fundamentally similar crises between an adversary and a third party. This qualified position was missing in the debate over Syrian chemical weapons in 2013, and should be embraced to better manage tense diplomatic relationships and periodic crises with other potentially hostile world powers. Schelling's work shows that reputation can be an ingredient for peace, and not merely a pretense for war.
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