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| 1 |
ID:
118155
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Capitalism has emerged as a force for peace in studies of interstate conflict. Is capitalism also a force for peace within nations? This article shows how a market-capitalist economy-one where most citizens normally obtain their livelihoods contracting in the market-creates citizen-wide preferences for universal freedom, peace, and the democratic rule of law. Prior research has corroborated the theory's predictions linking market-capitalism with liberal preferences, human rights, and peace among nations. Here, Granger tests of causality show that market-capitalism causes higher income, but higher income does not cause market-capitalism, and from 1961 to 2001 not a single civil war, insurgency, or rebellion occurred in any nation with a market-capitalist economy. Market-capitalism is the strongest variable in the civil conflict literature, and many of the most robust relationships in this literature are spurious-including income, state capacity, and oil-export dependency.
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| 2 |
ID:
082410
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2008.
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There is a broad consensus that democracy and economic development are among the key factors that promote better human rights practices in nations, but there is little agreement on how this happens. This article reports evidence that human rights, democracy, and development may all be at least partially explained by a fourth factor: market-contracting. Studies in economic history and sociology have established that in developing countries many exchanges of goods and services occur within social networks of friends and family. New institutionalist approaches posit that daily habits give rise to corresponding values and world-views. This study integrates these two fields of study to show how economic dependency on friends and family can promote perceived interests in discriminating strangers from out-groups and abiding by the orders of leaders. Dependency on strangers on a market, in contrast, can promote more individualistic identities and perceived interests in a state that enforces law and contracts with impartiality. This may cause the governments of nations with marketplace societies to be less likely than others to imprison political opponents and act contrary to law. On a large sample of nations from 1977 to 2000, robust support is found for this view: a change from weak to high levels of market-contracting is associated with a substantial 49% to 61% reduction in risk of state repression in nations. At least some of the variance in state repression accounted for by democracy and development may be attributed to market-contracting. This article introduces a new and robust variable in the field of human rights research, with direct policy implications: to reduce state repression, a crucial task is the achievement of market-oriented economic development
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| 3 |
ID:
119652
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2013.
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Recent studies show that the democratic peace correlation is not significant once the potentially confounding variable that can cause both democracy and peace, contract-intensive economy, is considered; this pattern holds in analyses of wars, fatal militarized interstate conflicts (Mousseau 2009), and interstate crises (Mousseau et al. 2013). These studies rescind the primary evidence for democracy being a cause of the democratic peace and indicate that contract-intensive economy is the more likely explanation for it. This article addresses all recent defenses of the democratic peace correlation, reports results using a new measure of contract flows, and extends the investigation to all militarized interstate conflicts. Analyses of most nations from 1961 to 2001 show that there is no correlation of democracy with peace, and contract-intensive economy is one of the most powerful nontrivial variables in international conflict. The era of the democratic peace appears to be at an end, subsumed by an economic peace.
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| 4 |
ID:
167616
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Permanent world peace is beginning to emerge. States with developed market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination of all states as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. Among other states, weaker powers, fearing those that are stronger, tend to bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers. The result is a powerful liberal global hierarchy that is unwittingly, but systematically, buttressing states' embrace of market norms and values, moving the world toward perpetual peace. Analysis of voting preferences of members of the United Nations General Assembly from 1946 to 2010 corroborates the influence of the liberal global hierarchy: states with weak internal markets tend to disagree with the foreign policy preferences of the largest market power (i.e., the United States), but more so if they have stronger rather than weaker military and economic capabilities. Market-oriented states, in contrast, align with the market leader regardless of their capabilities. Barring some dark force that brings about the collapse of the global economy (such as climate change), the world is now in the endgame of a five-century-long trajectory toward permanent peace and prosperity.
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| 5 |
ID:
087290
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Democracy does not cause peace among nations. Rather, domestic conditions cause both democracy and peace. From 1961 to 2001, democratic nations engaged in numerous fatal conflicts with each other, including at least one war, yet not a single fatal militarized incident occurred between nations with contract-intensive economies-those where most people have the opportunity to participate in the market. In contract-intensive economies, individuals learn to respect the choices of others and value equal application of the law. They demand liberal democracy at home and perceive it in their interest to respect the rights of nations and international law abroad. The consequences involve more than just peace: the contract-intensive democracies are in natural alliance against any actor-state or nonstate-that seeks to challenge Westphalian law and order. Because China and Russia lack contractualist economies, the economic divide will define great power politics in the coming decade. To address the challenges posed by China and Russia, preserve the Westphalian order, and secure their citizens from terrorism, the contract-intensive powers should focus their efforts on supporting global economic opportunity, rather than on promoting democracy.
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| 6 |
ID:
102507
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2011.
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Survey respondents in 14 countries representing 62% of the world's Muslim population indicate that approval of Islamist terror is not associated with religiosity, lack of education, poverty, or income dissatisfaction. Instead, it is associated with urban poverty. These results are consistent with the thesis that Islamist terrorists obtain support and recruits from the urban poor, who pursue their economic interests off the market in politics in collective groups. These groups compete over state rents, so a gain for one group is a loss for another, making terrorism of members of out-groups rational. The rise of militant Islam can be attributed to high rates of urbanization in many Muslim countries in recent decades, which fosters violence as rising groups seek to dislodge prior groups entrenched in power. Rising group leaders also compete over new urban followers, so they promote fears of out-groups and package in-group identities in ways that ring true for the urban poor. Because many of the urban poor are migrants from the countryside, popular packages are those which identify with traditional rural values and distinguish enemies as those associated with urban modernity and the secular groups already in power. Imams have an incentive to preach what audiences want to hear, so a mutated in-group version of Islam - Islamism - struck a chord in several large cities around the globe at the same time. With globalization of the media, in many developing countries the West is widely (albeit wrongly) perceived as an inimical out-group associated with urban modernity. The best political strategy to limit support and recruits for Islamist terrorist groups is to enhance the economic opportunities available for the urban poor and to provide them the needed services, such as access to health care and education, that many currently obtain from Islamist groups.
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