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ID:
110172
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| 2 |
ID:
154439
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| 3 |
ID:
106175
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| 4 |
ID:
174776
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s naval footprint in the Indian Ocean has expanded considerably over the last decade. This growing presence has led to significant debates about China’s goals and capabilities in the region. This article argues that China’s trajectory over the last ten years reflects an alignment of ends, ways and means in the Indian Ocean. The main driver behind China’s ambitions in the region is the need for Beijing to secure pivotal maritime lines of communications that carry a large share of Chinese oil imports and a sizable part of Chinese exports. Fulfilling this mission has required a significant adjustment of China’s naval strategy, and the addition of ‘open seas protection’ to the core missions of the PLA Navy. This strategy has, in turn, been supported by the development of a navy with increased sea control capabilities and overseas basing plans that have started to materialize in Djibouti.
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| 5 |
ID:
154367
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| Summary/Abstract |
China is the largest country in the region in terms of economic strength, military and land area, Since 2013, China has begun trying to alter the status quo in its neighbourhood, views the new US administrations policies as intended to retard its ambitions. While China's responses have been measured and deliberate, it has made clear it will not yield sovereignty over the South China sea. China has built airstrips and more recently, missile emplacements on the islands in the South China Sea, moved missiles to Hainan and in late February 2017, announced that it is constructing environment monitoring stations on the Scarborough Reef.
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| 6 |
ID:
128755
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Vij Books India Pvt.Ltd., 2013.
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| Description |
xvi, 168p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
9789382573210
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 057658 | 359.00951/DEW 057658 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
102856
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The PLA Navy's aviation branch, officially known as the PLA Navy Air Force (PLAN AF), comprises 25,000 personnel and more than 800 aircraft. It provides the PLA Navy with its own air capability independent of the PLA Air Force. But the Force remains largely land-based. However, the much speculated upon aircraft carrier program will impart a new dimension to the Chinese naval aviation. With the current level of national technological capability and available maritime infrastructure, the PLA Navy will, at best, be able to project power with its carriers within the South and East China Sea only, in the 2020 timeframe. It will find it increasingly hard to project power-using aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean Region without full-fledged military bases to support logistics and ship and aircraft maintenance/repairs. Thus the credible Chinese power projection capability in the Indian Ocean still appears to be at least two decades away. But the international community must take due cognizance of this inevitability now and commence preparations to face this forthcoming challenge.
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| 8 |
ID:
105659
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| 9 |
ID:
120552
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| Publication |
Washington DC, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2012.
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| Description |
226p.Hbk
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| Contents |
B
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 057303 | 355.60951/COR 057303 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
112194
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)'s recent accomplishments are impressive but have not gone beyond 'pocket excellence', as its overall structure and equipment are still out of date. However, the PLAN now has ships and powerful weapons that enable it to extend its combat range and engage its foes in a relatively large-scale maritime campaign beyond the Yellow Sea-its traditional battlefield. Depending on the nature of operations, it may already be able to carry out blue water missions around the first island chain in the West Pacific. Yet this article argues that due to its inherent weaknesses the PLAN has so far positioned itself as a regional navy, not a global one, in terms of its missions and capability building. On the other hand, the notion of a regional navy is open ended. As the PLAN acquires more ocean-going warships, its combat reach will incrementally expand, and its current defensive posture will acquire more teeth.
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| 11 |
ID:
154438
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| 12 |
ID:
103060
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| 13 |
ID:
151397
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the ongoing expansion of China’s maritime power in the Indian Ocean region and analyses its potential impact on the extant balance of Sino-Indian maritime power in the region. It posits that the expanding Chinese maritime power in the Indian Ocean could seriously challenge India’s geostrategic advantage in the near future and that India can no longer take for granted its strategic location at the centre of the Indian Ocean nor the strength of its historical ties with the various regional states. It further argues that the current Indian maritime strategy for the Indian Ocean region, to be the “net security provider” for the entire region, is unsustainable and thus needs to be reviewed and rebuilt leveraging the geographic advantage enjoyed by India over China in the Indian Ocean.
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| 14 |
ID:
122305
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's first aircraft carrier, LIAONING (CV16) was formally delivered and commissioned in service with PLA navy on 25th September 2012. The ship has been obtained through a nearly complete reconstruction of the depleted hull of the ex-Soviet Navy VARYAG, brought from Ukraine in 1998.
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| 15 |
ID:
082541
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The PLA Navy (PLAN)'s capabilities in key areas (assets, trained personnel, experience) are currently insufficient to support long-range sea lanes of communication (SLOC) defense missions. With sufficient effort, Beijing may eventually overcome these obstacles, but it would probably also have to acquire some form of overseas basing access, which its foreign policy still proscribes. As it works to bridge this gap, China will use 'soft power' diplomacy, trade, humanitarian assistance, and arms sales to increase its influence in the region, thereby preserving the possibility of cooperation with major regional and international actors.
*The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone. They do not represent the estimates or policies of the US Navy or any other element of the US Government. The author is indebted to William Murray for his meticulous reviews of several earlier versions.
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| 16 |
ID:
187350
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| Summary/Abstract |
Historical analogies are sometimes used to imagine the scope and nature of a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Using analogies, scenarios, and “images” of future war, instead of strategy, however, can produce an inadequate assessment of future material, operational, and tactical requirements that will be encountered by the U.S. Navy in the maritime domain. Without a long-term strategy to set force development and guide operational requirements, the U.S. Navy will suffer from a “strategy deficit” when it comes to dealing with deterrence, coercion, and escalation in the Indo-Pacific. As planning guidance, the use of analogies is no substitute for strategy.
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| 17 |
ID:
174931
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| Summary/Abstract |
Though the Indian Navy was not directly involved in the conflict of 1962, it had by then slowly created a significant surface force and had one aircraft carrier but was yet to induct submarines. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), on the other hand, was primarily geared for coastal defence but had a growing fleet of submarines. The sole naval threat from the PLAN was the possibility of deployment of its submarines. Yet, on this anniversary of the 1962 war, it is clear that any future conflict with China will spread to the Indian Ocean through which the great trading power’s Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) traverse. These SLOCs are the potential targets and obviously require guarding. The growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean attests to that. This article attempts to put forth the maritime picture in 1962 so as to induce thinking on the Chinese maritime threat in the future.
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| 18 |
ID:
122154
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| 19 |
ID:
106566
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| 20 |
ID:
154632
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