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| 1 |
ID:
098762
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| 2 |
ID:
166564
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the middle of the last century, the world has seen the emergence of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF). According to the Sovereign Wealth Funds Institute (2012), these legal entities can be defined as “a state-owned investment fund or entity that is commonly established from balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, governmental transfer payments, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from resource exports.” The SWFs are governed by the Santiago Principles, a document constructed by the IMF's International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) to recommend and to standardize the applications and investments of this kind of fund. SWFs are created in order to meet macroeconomic demands, using a series of investments strategies, which including foreign assets acquisitions. For instance, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund is one of the world's model SWFs. Its revenue is obtained from petroleum exploitation and is considered a savings fund, although part of the financial return can be applied in budget deficit. Following this example, Brazil created the Pre-Salt Social Fund to invest pre-salt petroleum revenues, and consists of a savings fund, according to the IMF classification. The present article focuses on the analysis and comparison of the legal structures of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund (GPF) and the Brazilian Pre-Salt Social Fund (SF), aiming to understand if the Brazilian fund applies the Norwegian standards.
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| 3 |
ID:
085703
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| 4 |
ID:
108709
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the changing role and governance of Singapore's two sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) over the past three decades - from their earlier participation in domestic national development to their more active involvement in Singapore's economic diplomacy. Based on a variety of sources and data, I argue that these two SWFs, Temasek Holdings and the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, are state-sanctioned means to secure the economic future of Singapore; they are not strategic devices developed by the Singapore government to pose geopolitical or economic threats on other states. Over time, their economic functions and strategic orientations have evolved with the city-state's dynamic developmental trajectories in the global economy. In the post-Cold War era of global finance, these state-controlled and professionally managed financial investment vehicles are more visible and active in their global expansion and acquisition trails. There are thus significant challenges to their strategic governance and international legitimacy in this new world order. This paper considers some of these challenges in light of recent development in the two SWFs and assesses their organizational and institutional responses to such challenges in today's competitive global economy. This case study of Singapore's SWFs illustrates the critical importance for understanding the rise of SWFs from small states in the evolving global system.
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| 5 |
ID:
089542
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
At the centre of the globalisation trend of the past few decades has been the creation of a global financial marketplace in which enormous sums of money came to be traded across the world unencumbered by capital controls.The future of this free wheeling, liberal international fenancial order is now in doubt.The most obvious challenge comes the global financial crisis that began in 2007, a crisis that is prompting governments everywhere to reconsider their commitment to deregulated finance.
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| 6 |
ID:
169895
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| Summary/Abstract |
Ghana in response to global best practices in managing volatile petroleum revenues included in its petroleum revenue management framework, the Ghana Stabilisation Fund (GSF). This study sought to evaluate the impact of volatile petroleum receipts on the GSF and measure the effect of discretionary capping on the ‘stabilisation’ role of the Fund since its establishment in 2011. Using qualitative comparative analysis and sensitivity analysis techniques, the study found that transfers into the GSF has been influenced to various degrees by total petroleum receipts, the variance between benchmark and actual revenues, transfers to the National Oil Company and discretion around transfers into the Fund in its initial years of operation. Out of the total of US$ 714,608,340 withdrawn from the GSF between 2014 and 2018, 86.72 percent has been transferred into the Debt Service Account/Sinking Fund (DSA/SF) and used to retire some marketable debt instruments (loans). It concludes that the GSF has impacted minimally on its primary object of cushioning or sustaining public expenditure capacity during periods of unanticipated petroleum revenue shortfalls and that, the Fund has been largely applied for debt repayment purposes than economic stabilisation over the past eight years.
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| 7 |
ID:
097773
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The global financial crisis has shattered many illusions, one of which being that sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are properly treated as arms-length investment institutions subject only to global standards of good governance. In fact, in a number of East Asian countries SWFs have acted as 'insurers of last resort' for their nation-states underwriting financial stability and social welfare. In this paper, we explain how and why this came to pass, arguing that this role serves to sustain the legitimacy of the nation-state as well as justify the separation of SWF assets from the public interest in current consumption and spending. Focusing upon the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC), we suggest that the prospect of recurrent financial crises was an important prompt for its establishment in 1981, reinforced by the experience of many East Asian countries in the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The formal constitution of the GIC, the mechanisms by which its reserves are returned to the government in crisis, and the role of different sections of the political elite in managing those assets are explained. Referencing the principles of best-practice fund governance and the Santiago Principles underwriting the legitimacy of SWFs, we also consider the governance of the GIC, especially as regards its investment processes. Implications are drawn for the experience of Western countries, particularly the UK and the USA, wherein the failure of their banking systems has put untold pressures on current and future living standards.
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| 8 |
ID:
085693
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| 9 |
ID:
109705
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) have different titles, goals and rules, but they share the underlying objective of helping governments deal with the problems created by large and variable revenues (mainly from energy or other commodity related sectors). In Kazakhstan, such a fund (the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan (NFRK)) was established in 2000. This fund operates as both a stabilisation and a savings fund. The first test for the NFRK was 2007-2009 financial crisis, where the NFRK "saved" the economy and guarantied its speedy recovery. The paper analyses the NFRK's operation up to 2007 and during the crisis years 2007-9, before drawing conclusions and implications for the future. Between 2001 and 2007 the NFRK conservatively accumulated assets, which proved to be useful in limiting the impact of the post-2007 crisis. However, the pre-2007 experience indicated structural weaknesses associated with discretionary executive authority and non-transparency. The paper concludes by observing that this history has created significant challenges for the future.
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| 10 |
ID:
089546
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2009.
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While the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) can claim over half of SWF assets globally, the largest and most strategically important state, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, has heretofore lacked a dedicated investment fund. This paper challenges some of the conventional wisdom on SWFs in explaining the Saudi government's reticence to launch an SWF and its recent decision to cautiously move in this direction. First, while Washington policy makers raise fears of enemies using SWFs against US interests, Saudi foreign assets have been used in support of its continuing alliance with the United States. And second, while critics decry the lack of transparency of SWFs, the Saudi launch of a new SWF could represent a move toward greater transparency, by working to separate "private" sovereign funds from "public" ones. Indeed, the launch of a SWF fits into a broad pattern of reforms rationalising Saudi governing institutions as King Abdullah has moved to control spendthrift princes, to streamline decision making, and to attract more foreign investment.
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| 11 |
ID:
091628
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the most striking financial developments in recent years is the emergence of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)-large publicly owned investment portfolios, which are growing rapidly in both number and size. In a global environment already roiled by a prolonged credit crisis, SWFs raise tricky and potentially controversial new questions for international financial regulation. One issue of concern to many in host countries is the possibility that some SWFs might be used for overt or tacit political purposes, posing a challenge for global monetary governance: a Great Tradeoff between the world community's collective interest in sustaining the openness of capital markets and the legitimate national security concerns of individual host countries. Can some balance between the two be found that will be both stable and acceptable to all concerned? Individually as well as collectively, recipient countries have begun to address the regulatory challenge directly. To date, however, accomplishments have been slight and have failed to stem a noticeable drift towards financial protectionism. A review of some recent proposals suggests that there is no foolproof solution to the Great Tradeoff. But the potential for controversy could be significantly reduced by a negotiated agreement among host governments addressing three key issues: definitions, risk assessment and dispute resolution. The most logical venue for such an exercise would be the OECD, building on its already extensive experience with international investment issues.
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| 12 |
ID:
089543
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Concerns have been raised that Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) might be used by governments to advance international political goals, raising red flags about their possible economic and national security consequences. These concerns are overstated. Warnings about national security threats related to foreign investment have been sounded repeatedly throughout history, but they have invariably been false alarms. Although there are novel attributes about SWFs in contemporary world politics, establishing their national security consequences is much more difficult than it might seem. And in those instances where theoretical connections between SWFs and "high politics" can be established, on closer inspection the SWFs appear to be intervening variables - manifestations of other pathologies - rather than the root cause of the postulated problem. The potential geopolitical problems caused by SWFs are the result of shifts in wealth in the international system, and not by the establishment or functioning of wealth funds.
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| 13 |
ID:
085702
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| 14 |
ID:
103645
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Timor-Leste in 2010 continued to stabilize following the political and social crisis of 2006-08. With strong economic growth and a calm security situation, the year was defined by twin national debates that will dominate the country's long-term future: how to manage its significant energy resources and how best to use the accruing wealth.
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| 15 |
ID:
089545
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The rise of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) as major investors in the global economy has raised worries that they serve the geopolitical ends of owner countries. However, given the paramount importance of surviving domestic political competitions, SWFs are likely also tools of domestic political survival. In examining the corporate governance and underlying political environment in which SWFs in Singapore and in China operate, this paper further examines the role of political unity in directing SWF behaviour in authoritarian regimes. The main finding is that a highly unified autocracy is more likely to direct SWFs to maximise long-term profit, while a fragmented one like China is more likely to treat its SWF as an arena for domestic political and bureaucratic infighting. SWFs operating in a fragmented regime are unlikely to make long-term profit and foreign policy objectives top priorities, and their behaviour can be highly unpredictable.
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| 16 |
ID:
086570
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A spectre is stalking the world: the spectre of a rich Chinese state buying strategic resources, hollowing out companies, gobbling up financial institutions and threatening the sovereignty of the countries in whose resources and companies it invests. The China Investment Corporation (CIC) - a sovereign wealth fund company (SWF) - is the stalking horse of the Chinese state. Using the CIC as an example, this article argues that the warning about SWFs has little to do with their size, the speed of their growth or what SWFs have or have not done. It is about a shifting power relationship in the global economy. This broader realignment may have been occurring slowly, but it is happening. Neither side - those who have been writing the rules of the game for international political economy and those who are historically rule-takers - is fully willing to acknowledge the shift and take responsibility to build a new architecture of an international financial system that can accommodate interests of old and new players.
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| 17 |
ID:
082642
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The sovereign wealth club acquired a new member with the official launch of the China Investment Corporation (CIC) on 29 September 2007. The arrival of CIC has further heated up debate regarding sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and their potential implications for global financial markets. This is because, in carrying out its investments, CIC can tap into China's huge official foreign exchange reserves, which by April 2008 had surged to US$1.76tn. CIC's initial working capital of US$200bn makes it the fifth largest SWF in the world today. This article seeks to analyze CIC's investment strategies, as well as their potential economic and political implications for global as well as US financial markets
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