| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
029301
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Washington, Brookings Institution, 1966.
|
| Description |
xviii, 326p.
|
| Series |
Studies of Government Finance
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 012153 | 336.22/NET 012153 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
128446
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This paper evaluates the effects of a property tax bonus to promote the installation of solar-thermal energy systems in buildings in Andalusia (southern Spain). The propensity score matching methodology is used. The treatment group consists of municipalities of Andalusia that established property tax bonuses in their municipalities in 2010. The control group consists of municipalities that did not. The response variable measures the number of new square meters of solar thermal systems installed in 2010. The analysis leads to the conclusion that municipalities that established a property tax bonus had installed, on average, 102.245 to 122.389 square meters more. These results indicate that the percentage increase in squares meters installed in municipalities which adopted the tax bonus promotion ranged from 70.74% to 98.38%. These percentages were lower for rural municipalities (49.00% to 77.06%).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
139635
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Effective local government taxation is critical to achieving the governance benefits widely attributed to decentralization, but in practice successful tax reform has been rare because of entrenched political resistance. This article offers new insights into the political dynamics of property tax reform through a case study of Sierra Leone, focusing on variation in experiences and outcomes across the country's four largest city councils. Based on this evidence, the article argues that elite resistance has posed a particularly acute barrier to local government tax reform, but that ethnic diversity has sometimes served to strengthen reform by fragmenting elite resistance. Furthermore, opposition councils have had stronger incentives to strengthen tax collection than councils dominated by the ruling party, in order to increase their fiscal autonomy. More generally, heightened electoral competition can lead to sustained revenue gains by encouraging city councils to adopt a more contractual approach to tax reform that stresses transparency, engagement, and equity.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
082643
|
|
|