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| 1 |
ID:
139506
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| Summary/Abstract |
Today, as often in the past, the United States Intelligence Community (IC) continues to be a target of criticism for activities—interrogations and renditions—that appear to shock the conscience of many in the public as well as for developing surveillance capabilities that could violate the civil liberties of United States residents. Intelligence agencies are often portrayed as undermining the larger values of American society, pervaded by law-breaking and incompetence, and making only incidental contributions to the national security. Much of the academic literature on intelligence is narrowly focused on intelligence “revelations,” organizational histories of particular agencies, and on biographies of significant spies.
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| 2 |
ID:
131045
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Intelligence agencies exist to support government officials with information and analysis; unlike some academic institutions, they do not exist simply to promote the greater diffusion of knowledge. Intelligence officials serve a wide array of masters-Presidents, diplomats, policy planners, military commanders, and other government officials. In the United States, the need to support these diverse masters has brought into existence a complicated and cumbrous community of some seventeen organizations. 1 These agencies have been created over many years to describe and analyze the international environment and, ideally, give advance warning of imminent developments.
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| 3 |
ID:
082825
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although widely criticized for inaccurate estimates of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in 2002, the United States Intelligence Community was far more prescient about the likely consequences of a military campaign to remove Saddam Hussein. Intelligence assessments of the challenges likely to be faced by a post-war Iraq were widely disseminated within the Executive Branch and Congress and may have served to justify the Bush Administration's decision to undertake extensive reconstruction efforts rather than to turn power over at once to Iraqi leaders.
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