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| 1 |
ID:
082922
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article deals with the anarchist and the partisan as forerunners of contemporary terrorism. It investigates their different relationship to the state, the anarchist trying to replace it and the partisan trying to conquer it and what that means in terms of resistance, critique, and position on the use of force. The article is both theoretical and historical, trying to place the anarchist and the partisan within their different time epochs and institutional settings. It ends by discussing if and how a third type of political violence, Islamist terrorism, can be interpreted within the analytical framework of legality/illegality and regularity/irregularity worked out in the article, that is, to what extent is current the Islamist terrorist a child of the anarchist and the partisan
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| 2 |
ID:
126294
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| 3 |
ID:
103675
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| 4 |
ID:
115214
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The introduction sets out the theme of the special issue. It introduces the topic of escalation by discussing the current state of the art in the literature and it outlines the set up of the remainder of the issue.
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| 5 |
ID:
115220
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The final contribution brings together the main findings of the individual articles, draws conclusions and formulates future research challenges in regards to understanding the escalation and de-escalation of irregular war.
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| 6 |
ID:
115215
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
If all violence is intended to achieve political effects, what is distinctive about escalation in irregular war? Indeed, what is irregular war? To answer such fundamental questions this analysis employs the principles of strategic theory in an attempt to offer a theoretical and practical framework that will facilitate an appreciation of the subsequent contributions to this special issue. The assessment seeks to articulate how the escalation process in conditions of so-called irregular war might be conceptualized and, via examples, illustrate how certain broad observations may be held to be true. Ultimately, though, the argument emphasizes that the process of escalation cannot be distinctive or follow predictable patterns given that all wars are unique to their time and place and will be affected in their conduct by the contingent forces of passion, chance and reason.
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| 7 |
ID:
165182
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| Summary/Abstract |
Mexico’s defeat in the war that (in the U.S.) takes the country’s name resulted as much from the strategic context created by unrealized nation-building that followed independence as it did from American tactical supremacy. Three centuries of Spanish empire did not translate into national military excellence due to the decades of revolutionary upheaval that followed the sudden decapitation occasioned by Napoleon’s ouster of the monarchy in Madrid. That the occupation which followed major combat provided salutary lessons learned in dealing with guerrillas rather than a Vietnam-like litany of quagmire eventuated from the conscious designs of military leadership steeped in the same Napoleonic dynamic that had produced our opponent. The United States wisely chose to leave issues of state-building and governance to the Mexicans themselves, while annexing the sparsely populated northern remnant of Spanish empire.
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| 8 |
ID:
139115
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| Summary/Abstract |
Personal cognitive processes inform how individuals understand their environment. Cultural variation, fundamental attribution error, causal attribution, and durability bias create obstacles to Western understanding of irregular war and have created a significant institutional bias in how the US military perceives its enemies- a perception only somewhat softened after a decade of irregular war. United Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is in a better position to overcome these problems through persistent engagement. In the event of major conflict, environmentally sensitized military planners will be better able to achieve military and policy objectives.
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| 9 |
ID:
171599
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| 10 |
ID:
087356
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article uses the analytical model put forward by Kalyvas in his Logic of Violence in Civil War to explore the violent transition experienced by Barrancabermeja from 1998 onwards, when the increasing insurgent presence was curbed by paramilitary groups and government forces. While the model sheds light on the causal mechanisms that led to violence against civilians, it fails to predict some of the observed outcomes; these anomalies are discussed with a view to expanding its explanatory power. Furthermore, the paper highlights the relevance of socioeconomic factors and spatial segregation in predicting the distribution of violence.
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