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| 1 |
ID:
157798
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| Summary/Abstract |
Little is known about attitudes among ordinary adolescents in favour of the use of political violence and radicalization. We draw on a survey from a population sample of adolescents (n = 8627) in the Norwegian capital, Oslo. We first compared adolescents with Muslim, Christian and no religious affiliation with regard to attitudes in favour of the use of violence for political purposes and support of those who go to Syria to take part in active combat. Muslim youth reported higher levels of support for the use of violence to obtain societal change than did other adolescents. The same pattern was revealed with regard to support for the fighters in Syria. After control for other variables, Muslim affiliation had no impact on attitudes in favour of politically motivated violence, though it remained significant for support for the fighters in Syria. However, here as well we found associations with poor school grades, conduct problems and exposure to violence, possibly indicating an emerging adolescent ‘outsider’ position. Political activity on social media also played a role. Such attitudes rarely develop into politically motivated violence and jihadism. However, for a small minority, they may represent the first step in that direction.
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| 2 |
ID:
188037
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| Summary/Abstract |
Progress in understanding and responding to terrorism and violent extremism has continued to stall in part because we often fail to adequately conceptualize the problem. Perhaps most notably, much of our terminology (for instance, “radicalization”) and many variants of our existing models and analogies (including conveyor belts, staircases and pyramids) conflate sympathy for this violence with involvement in its creation. As its name suggests, the Attitudes-Behaviors Corrective (ABC) model seeks to overcome this issue by placing this key disconnect between attitudes and behaviors at its core. In this paper, we first present the key elements of our model, which include a graphic representation of this disconnect and a classification system of the drivers of violent extremism. The former enables us to track the trajectories of individuals in relation to both their attitudes and behaviors, while the latter helps ensure that we consider all potential explanations for these movements. We then adapt these elements to focus on exit from violence, applying the dual concepts of disengagement and deradicalization. Finally, we conclude with a section that aims to provide the research community and those tasked with preventing and countering violent extremism with practical benefits from the ABC model.
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| 3 |
ID:
148936
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| Summary/Abstract |
Between 1968 and the late 1970s, a significant number of U.S. white leftist groups escalated their protest to armed struggle. After experimenting briefly with violence, they opted for low-intensity armed propaganda that targeted property and avoided hurting people. By contrast, European leftist groups and anti-colonial organizations in the U.S. made extensive use of antipersonnel violence. Why did U.S. leftists eschew attacks against civilians? Scholarship does not explain this case, as it focuses either on the internal dynamics of a single group or on structural variables. Conversely, this article addresses this question through a historical reconstruction and a multilevel analysis. The research identifies the critique and ensuing de-solidarization by the radical milieu as the main factor accounting for the restraint of violence. This article demonstrates that the radical milieu censored and isolated armed groups as soon as they escalated and began to endanger human lives. Therefore, in order to safeguard the solidarity pact with their constituencies, violent fringes moderated their repertoires of action. This article employs primary sources and original interviews with militants to support this claim and to assess the relevance of three concurrent factors: the trauma generated by the “townhouse incident,” the deterrence by law enforcement, and the militants’ socio-economic background.
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| 4 |
ID:
091826
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The narrative of the historic struggle against colonialism is subject to a high degree of political manipulation in North Africa. Myths, memories and symbols based on the struggle against colonial oppression, whether 'true' or not, provide a latent and continually relevant context for understanding and interpreting contemporary events. For both recent North African immigrants, and second, third and fourth generation immigrants to Europe, contemporary injustices and violence, whether perpetrated in Europe or in the Maghreb, are being understood in this historical colonial context. For some, these myths, memories and symbols may be the reason why they join a peaceful, democratic group to lobby for democracy and political transparency. For a minority of North Africans, these symbols of the past are invoked to justify a jihadist challenge to North African regimes and the West. Based on extensive interviews with North African activists and community leaders, this article will show how the collective memory of the abuse of power by the state, both during and after the colonial era, has created a latent mistrust of the West, especially of France. Political repression in North Africa since independence has created a rupture between what was expected from independence and the realities of political life, and North Africans often ascribe this disappointment to the inherently French character of the regimes which were in power during the 1950s and 1960s. North Africans also believe that this is reflected in the continuing active intervention on the part of the West to support these illiberal regimes in the face of democratic and popular challenges. The subsequent senses of injustice and disappointment, relating to the use and abuse of state power, continues to shape North African political mobilization and, worryingly, has created a latent basis for radicalization among North Africans living and working in Europe.
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| 5 |
ID:
138335
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article considers the importance of Al-Qaeda and Pakistan in driving British Islamic extremist terrorism during the past decade. Between 2003 and 2013, almost 50 British-born Muslims engaged in multiple high-profile terrorism conspiracies. All were designed to kill or seriously injure British citizens. Drawing on recently obtained court transcripts which offer remarkable detail, these plots are analysed from the point of view of radicalization, finance, training and operational direction. The emergence of extremist terrorism in the UK has its genesis within the Islamic fundamentalist movement, a socio-political ideology that arrived in London in the early 1990s. Contrary to the prevailing discourse, members of the movement constitute a far from homogenous set of individuals. Based on age, overseas connections, experience of conflict and religiosity, they each fulfill diverse tasks that range from preaching and fundraising to facilitating combative jihad. A minority adopted an extremist position that led them to carry out acts of terrorism. Since 2006, the role of Al-Qaeda and Pakistan in relation to this process has steadily declined. For the past seven years British Islamic extremists have pursued terrorism in whatever way they can on their own, with little or any direct support or influence from overseas. The security agencies are now asking how far current events in Syria will overturn this state of affairs.
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| 6 |
ID:
105991
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recently many scholars have focused their attention on the dynamics of radicalization, de-radicalization, and disengagement, yet most studies are based on indirect and/or data which is difficult to verify. An exception comes from Italy, where authorities have recently benefited from the insights of two former members of an al Qaeda-affiliated Tunisian network. The two have voluntarily described to authorities the process and factors that led them to their radicalization and encouraged them to abondon the network. Based on thousands of pages of their unpublished confessions, the article provides a case study of radicalization that is rich in detail and uniquely reliable.
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| 7 |
ID:
164605
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| Summary/Abstract |
Growing concerns about small-scale, low sophistication terrorist attacks, and the difficulties they present for security services, make public coproduction of security increasingly necessary. Communication to ensure that the public(s) is aware of the role they can play will be central to this. This article, based on interviews with thirty expert practitioners, explores challenges associated with communication designed to prevent radicalization, interdict attack planning and mitigate the impacts of a terrorist attack in the United Kingdom and Denmark. The interplay between these challenges and the contemporary terrorist context are analyzed, highlighting that new, or adapted, communications and approaches may be necessary.
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| 8 |
ID:
103983
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It is commonly acknowledged that weiquan lawyers operate in a narrow space, and lawyers with a radical stance work within a harsh environment. Weiquan lawyers advance and retreat in response to the changing macro-political-legal environment, but there is no sign that they are giving up their legal struggles. A steadily growing number of weiquan lawyers are tending to become more radical in their approach as their experience advances. This article studies the process in which weiquan lawyers start and sustain weiquan lawyering in a harsh environment and the factors that contribute to the radicalizing process. Its principal purpose is to identify and explain a radicalization process in which a lawyer climbs up the ladder of weiquan lawyering, from a moderate lawyer providing legal aid in individual cases to a critical or radical lawyer.
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| 9 |
ID:
120329
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article addresses four assumptions behind many of the current theoretical and policy approaches to individual processes of Islamist radicalization in Europe: the association with terrorism and extremism; determinism; the extraordinary nature of radicals; and the reification of the grievance and collective identity discourse. It argues for an intentional and developmental, rather than structural and socio-economic feature-focused, approach to the explanation of the radicalization process, with the consideration of framing and socio-psychological mechanisms having an impact on individual decision-making processes, and for an overall, broader conceptual understanding of radicalism.
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| 10 |
ID:
178902
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| Summary/Abstract |
Al-Shabaab, the East-African affiliate of Al Qaeda has carried out a number of large-scale devastating attacks in the region and a steady stream of smaller scale ones. In recent years Al-Shabaab’s ongoing strength has relied upon its ability to build local support within Kenya. This work looks at Kwale County on Kenya’s coast and examines some of the factors involved in radicalization and/or recruitment into the group, including economic hardship, historical marginalization, land injustices, drugs, problems at the family level and poor relationships with state security agencies. It highlights the more recent phenomenon of those returning from fighting with Al-Shabaab and the problems of their reintegration. It concludes that there are a number of phenomenon related in complex and sometimes self-perpetuating ways which all need to be considered in the response to radicalization and recruitment.
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| 11 |
ID:
099654
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The ubiquity of use of the term "radicalization" suggests a consensus about its meaning, but this article shows through a review of a variety of definitions that no such consensus exists. The article then argues that use of the term is problematic not just for these reasons, but because it is used in three different contexts: the security context, the integration context, and the foreign-policy context. It is argued that each of these contexts has a different agenda, impacted in the case of the integration agenda by the rise of European "neo-nationalism," and so each uses the term "radical" to mean something different. The use of one term to denote at least three different concepts risks serious confusion. The proposed solution is to abandon the attempt to use "radicalization" as an absolute concept.
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| 12 |
ID:
155341
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE HEINOUS ACTS OF TERROR in the first few months of the current year, indiscriminate slaughter of civilians, persecution of whole communities (particularly on the grounds of religion or belief), metro bombings, and terrorist attacks against major European cities continue to shock and horrify. Is it possible to take effective action against such atrocities? What can be done to prevent the assassination of an ambassador or a grenade launcher attack on a consulate general?* How can we enable people to travel by public transport, attend public events, and meet with friends in cafés and restaurants without fearing for their lives or for the lives of their children, friends and relatives?
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| 13 |
ID:
188047
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| Summary/Abstract |
CVE is a diverse policy space involving efforts to build cohesive communities, support young people who are vulnerable to radicalization, and deradicalize convicted terrorism offenders. Recently, the public health model of disease prevention has become an influential framework for understanding these diverse components. In this paper, I argue that crime prevention should be preferred as a conceptual framework for CVE. I offer a criminological framework encompassing situational prevention, developmental prevention, community crime prevention, third-party policing and procedural justice policing. I develop these concepts into an agenda for crime prevention research in CVE. I also briefly outline some of the lessons that the evidence base from criminology may provide when designing CVE programs and policy.
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| 14 |
ID:
138772
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this short essay, we introduce readers to a special issue of Terrorism and Political Violence on criminological approaches to the study of terrorism. In addition to summarizing the eight articles in the issue, we outline some general points about the relationship between criminological thinking and our understanding of terrorism. Our goal is to place the special issue's contributions in context and highlight under-explored issues that future research could address.
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| 15 |
ID:
116100
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| 16 |
ID:
179901
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This article introduces this special section on the topic of gender and extremism/violent extremism in the Western Balkans. The author argues that this topic is best understood as a social phenomenon and an example of political violence. She briefly introduces some relevant concepts before summarizing the four articles in the collection, and then notes common over-arching themes.
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| 17 |
ID:
160491
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| Summary/Abstract |
A variety of theories attempt to explain why some individuals radicalize along religious lines. Few studies, however, have jointly put these diverse hypotheses under empirical scrutiny. Focusing on Muslim–Christian tensions in Kenya, we distill salient micro-, meso-, and macro-level hypotheses that try to account for the recent spike in religious radicalization. We use an empirical strategy that compares survey evidence from Christian and Muslim respondents with differing degrees of religious radicalization. We find no evidence that radicalization is predicted by macro-level political or economic grievances. Rather, radicalization is strongly associated with individual-level psychological trauma, including historically troubled social relations, and process-oriented factors, particularly religious identification and exposure to radical networks. The findings point to a model of radicalization as an individual-level process that is largely unaffected by macro-level influences. As such, radicalization is better understood in a relational, idea-driven framework as opposed to a macro-level structural approach.
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| 18 |
ID:
169087
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| Publication |
Dhaka, IPAG, 2020.
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| Description |
vi, 260p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9789843467768
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059762 | 303.4833/KHA 059762 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 19 |
ID:
156906
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| Summary/Abstract |
This research used open source information to investigate the motivational backgrounds of 219 suicide attackers from various regions of the world. We inquired as to whether the attackers exhibited evidence for significance quest as a motive for their actions, and whether the eradication of significance loss and/or the aspiration for significance gain systematically differed according to attackers’ demographics. It was found that the specific nature of the significance quest motive varied in accordance with attackers’ gender, age, and education. Whereas Arab-Palestinians, males, younger attackers, and more educated attackers seem to have been motivated primarily by the possibility of significance gain, women, older attackers, those with little education, and those hailing from other regions seem to have been motivated primarily by the eradication of significance loss. Analyses also suggested that the stronger an attacker’s significance quest motive, the greater the effectiveness of their attack, as measured by the number of casualties. Methodological limitations of the present study were discussed, and the possible directions for further research were indicated.
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| 20 |
ID:
090333
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