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ID:
082927
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay reflects on the period of Putin's presidency in a broader context of general Russian history and maintains that Putin's Bonapartist mission has been historically predetermined. By characterizing the contemporary stage in Russia's political evolution as the Russian Thermidor, the author explains, from this viewpoint, the revanchist policy of Russia towards the West, as well as in the post-Soviet area, and predicts an inevitable drive to 'regather' the severed historic Russian lands, including territorial claims to the 'newly independent states,' as the ultimate resolution of the 'Russian Question.' Explicating the 'shock therapy' transition to capitalism as a robbery of state assets by the Russian plutocracy, the author argues in favor of the Chinese transition model and concludes that, in spite of all these detriments, the resurgence of Russia as a great power is ensured by its intellectual, economic and military potential, boosted by the highest oil and gas prices in history.
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| 2 |
ID:
188124
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article revisits the key factors that have reshaped European security to serve as a baseline for framing two distinct paths that will determine the continent’s security architecture in the coming decades. At the center of this discussion is Europe’s answer to the “Russian question”: the role that Russia wants to play in Europe as compared to the level of influence it may be able to achieve through economic pressure and military force. It posits that the answer is inextricably connected to how Germany’s foreign policy evolves going forward, especially the German-Polish relationship and military trilateral cooperation between the United States, Germany, and Poland. It will also touch on the issue of Brexit as arguably the most significant development that will continue to shape European security for years to come, and, by extension, America’s European strategy.
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