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Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
183729
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Summary/Abstract |
This extended article argues a case for an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Confederation, proposes the central elements necessary to realize this in practice, and offers policy advice to the key players as well as to policy makers in the United States, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. After 73 years of conflict, following the Arab Spring, and the intermittent violence between Israel and the Palestinians, the Palestinians will not give up on their aspiration for statehood. Ultimately, a two-state solution remains the only viable option to end their conflict. The difference, however, between the framework for peace discussed in the 1990s and 2000s—where the focus was on establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza—versus the present time is that many new, irreversible facts have been created: the interspersing of the Israeli and Palestinian populations in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel; the status of Jerusalem, where both sides have a unique religious affinity; Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the majority of which will have to remain in place; the intertwined national security concerns involved; and the resettlement of/compensation for Palestinian refugees. I argue that independent Israeli and Palestinian states, therefore, can peacefully coexist and be sustained only through the establishment of an Israeli-Palestinian confederation that would subsequently be joined by Jordan, which has an intrinsic national interest in the resolution of all conflicting issues between Israel and the Palestinians. To that end, all sides will have to fully and permanently collaborate on many levels necessitated by the changing conditions on the ground, most of which can no longer be restored to the status quo ante.
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2 |
ID:
188829
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Summary/Abstract |
This article introduces the World Affairs 2022 special issue which contains ten contributions, including this one, debating the proposal for an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian confederation published in this journal earlier this year. In the present article, I continue and expand some of the arguments in the previous proposal. The notion that the time is not ripe to bring an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is misguided and extremely dangerous. When and how a more conducive environment will be created to restart peace negotiations remains elusive. Even a cursory review of the daily encounters between Israelis and Palestinians in the occupied territories and Gaza point to the intensity of hatred, enmity, and utter contempt they feel toward one another, which if continued unabated will be a recipe for an unprecedented violent conflagration. To avert the inevitable, every concerned individual must do everything humanly possible to help in creating new psychological, political, and physical conditions that would facilitate a dialogue and engender a new momentum to start a process of reconciliation before it is too late. This should eventually lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state under the umbrella of an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian confederation, where all three countries maintain their independence and can grow and prosper together and live in mutual security and peace.
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3 |
ID:
104677
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4 |
ID:
134754
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Summary/Abstract |
There are many who doubt that the current Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will lead to a solution, in spite of US secretary of state John Kerry’s efforts and the presumed commitment to peace of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas. What has characterized the intractability of the conflict in the past, including the future of Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees, Israel’s national security concerns, and, in particular, the psychological dimension behind these conflicting issues, still remain in play. That intractability has been further aggravated by a faulty framework for the 2014 negotiations, the absence of leadership, the continued public recrimination of each side toward the other, mutual distrust, and the lack of commitment to reach an agreement that of necessity requires mutually painful concessions. This essay proposes a number of mechanisms and corrective measures that could appreciably enhance the prospect of reaching a peace agreement. Undergirding these proposals is the need for the United States to put its foot down and warn both the Israelis and Palestinians that, unless they negotiate in earnest based on Kerry’s proposed framework, there will be serious consequences resulting from a reassessment of its bilateral relations with both parties.
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5 |
ID:
093836
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6 |
ID:
087374
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
political constituency represented in all
Israeli coalition governments. Successive
Israeli governments have provided fi nancial
means and protection to the settlers
with near total disregard for the profound
impact on Israeli-Palestinian relations. As
a result, any Israeli peace overture under
these circumstances has been viewed by
the Arab states as an empty slogan and a
cynical attempt to sway public opinion.
Contrary to the facts on the ground, as the
occupation becomes less and less tenable,
Israeli governments continue to justify it
as indispensable to national security in an
effort to justify further entrenchment.
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7 |
ID:
086755
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
The article by Alon Ben-Meir addresses the insecurity created by states with nuclear weapons, and specifically discusses strategy for negotiating with Iran to prevent it from becoming another nuclear power. Again, one of the chief failures is the inability of larger powers and powers with different cultural expectations to engage in meaningful negotiation rather than using force which causes a greater reaction. Ben-Meir recognizes that at the heart of the matter is the desire of every people to improve their own well-being and that of their society. When threatened, a state, just like a person, reacts defensively. One key to negotiation with Iran is to include, in exchange for agreement to drop its nuclear weapons program, assistance in economic improvement, other guarantees of regional security, and recognition of grievances that have not been addressed.
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8 |
ID:
088191
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9 |
ID:
137406
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10 |
ID:
083017
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11 |
ID:
085619
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