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ID:
106782
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Fearing a loss of sovereignty, UN member states have historically been hesitant to provide the UN with an intelligence-collection mandate. The increased size, length and complexity of peacekeeping operations, compounded by severe security threats to UN personnel, make a stronger UN intelligence capability in the field increasingly necessary. The article examines the contribution of the UN's Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) to UN intelligence capabilities and concludes that, in larger missions in particular, the multidisciplinary JMAC structure has delivered valuable intelligence to senior mission management. Nevertheless, in all missions improved information-sharing procedures are necessary to ensure that the JMAC is able to fulfil its intelligence mandate.
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| 2 |
ID:
083195
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
New understandings of operational and security challenges in multidimensional missions have provided the momentum to overcome resistance to the establishment of an intelligence capacity in UN field missions. Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) have been set up in several missions and are beginning to fulfil this function, both with respect to security aspects of operations and (to a lesser extent) in support of integrated management. However, the contribution JMACs could make to integration is not being fully realized. This is partly a result of the choice to focus expectations for integration at the level of the head of mission, while neglecting to give institutions at a higher level the backing they need to effectively harmonize the priorities and impulses of the Security Council and other parts of the organization. This has led to a perception of integration as a technology of subordination that favours a security agenda over other goals of the UN system. Consequently, the JMAC has been unable to gain the trust and commitment it needs to fully realize its potential to support the strategic management of integrated missions
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